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Abstract
Using Kelman’s framework of the nature of international intractable conflict, this
thesis seeks to examine thoroughly the unrelenting hostilities between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The analysis will include the history of
the primary parties in context, the root causes, the key issues, the needs, fears and other
social-psychological factors driving and perpetuating the conflict. Special attention will
be given to the secondary actors of the dispute since they play important roles in the
conflict and have their own agendas. The secondary actors include Turkey, Russia, the
Armenian Diaspora, the United States, the European Union, Iran, and Georgia.

The paper will discuss the conventional approaches o f international conflict
resolution such as official negotiation and mediation. These track-one diplomatic theories
will be compared to the new social-psychological approaches employed in track-two
diplomacy. The recent OSCE Minsk Group mediation efforts and results will be
presented in an effort to demonstrate the limitations o f track-one diplomacy as a sole
conflict resolution method in the international arena. The paper will propose the
utilization of Ronald Fisher’s Interactive Conflict Resolution model as a supplement to
the official peacemaking efforts. The opponents o f Fisher’s theory will be refuted through
a comparative case analysis of several intractable conflicts in which the Interactive

Conflict Resolution theory was applied, and appears to have exerted a positive effect on
the stalled negotiations. An assessment of this approach will attempt to reveal its
potential for overcoming the impasse and improving the chances of a peaceful resolution.
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Introduction
Conflict has always been a part of human existence. Researchers and practitioners
in the conflict resolution field have an infinite supply o f cases to scrutinize and material
to explore. It seems like some conflicts are always in the international spotlight, while
others have long faded into the background and do not draw much international attention.
Nevertheless, even those seemingly distant and what some might characterize as
unimportant clashes may lead to dire consequences for the parties involved, their region,
and the world. The subject of this work is one of the world’s small intractable conflicts,
in a land ravaged by hostilities since 1988 - the stalemate between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.

This thesis will study that conflict by examining the social-psychological factors
which have made it intractable. A better understanding o f the conflict’s underlying issues
and dynamics is the first step in the development o f a more effective peace process. The
paper focuses on one of the new methods o f conflict resolution which has been gaining
the support of international peacemakers during the last decade. In his 1997 book, the
social-psychologist Ronald Fisher labeled the method Interactive Conflict Resolution.'
The main proposition of the paper is that the official peace process is inadequate
to resolve the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, because it fails to address the important
social-psychological aspects which remain at the core o f the hostilities. These elements of
the intractable conflict call for social-psychological approaches to conflict resolution.
1 William I. Zartman, ed., Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods &
Techniques, (Washington DC: United States Institute o f Peace, 2007), 61.
1

Therefore, the official track-one diplomatic efforts must be supplemented by track two
methods such as Interactive Conflict Resolution.

Chapter 1 offers an assessment o f the geo-political, historical, religious, and
economic realities of the primary actors through the lens o f John Burton’s deep-rooted
human needs perspective. In his work, Burton makes a clear distinction between
“dispute” and “conflict” explaining that unlike disputes, “conflicts arise out o f the
frustration of basic human needs that cannot be compromised or suppressed.”
In Chapter 2, using Kelman’s framework of the nature o f international intractable
conflict, the analysis includes the root causes, the key issues, the needs, fears and other
socio-psychological factors driving and perpetuating the conflict. The research examines
historical events and official documents, and consults numerous news articles and
scholarly publications on the subject. Special attention is given to the secondary actors of
the dispute since they play important roles in the conflict influenced by their own
agendas. These secondary actors include Turkey, Russia, the Armenian Diaspora, the
United States, the European Union, Iran, and Georgia.
The emphasis in Chapter 3 is placed on the official international conflict
resolution theories such as negotiation and mediation. The OSCE’s Minsk group and its
challenges and limitations as a chief mediator o f the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict are
discussed while recent mediation efforts and results are presented. Factors hindering the
~ Ronald J. Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1997), 6.
3 Ibid., 32.
2

efficacy of the official international mediation o f the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are
discussed. These track-one diplomatic theories are compared to the new socialpsychological approaches employed in track-two diplomacy. Chapter 4 offers an
evaluation of the theory of Interactive Conflict Resolution as part o f the international
peacemaking framework. The opponents of Fisher’s theory will be refuted through a
comparative case analysis of four seemingly intractable conflicts in which the Interactive

Conflict Resolution theory was applied, and had a positive effect on the stalled
negotiations. Chapter 5 presents recommendations for overcoming the impasse and
improving the chances o f a peaceful resolution. It evaluates warnings and predictions for
the conflict’s perpetuation and escalations and reaffirms the Interactive Conflict
Resolution model’s potential to ameliorate the inadequacy o f the current pursuit for
peace.

3

Chapter 1
Assessment of the Conflict and Its Primary Actors

Gods and men love maps
they draw borders with pens that
split lives like an ax.

The origin of the interactive conflict resolution theory can be traced to the
pioneering work o f John Burton and his colleagues in London during the mid 1960s.5
Burton conceptualized the idea that “deep-rooted conflict” is linked to frustration o f basic
human needs that are not subject to compromise or coerced settlement. This type of
conflict is very different than a dispute over tangible, negotiable interests. These needs
are related to the basic individual and collective human rights o f identity, dignity,
security, equity, voice, and self-determination. According to Burton, traditional
approaches to conflict resolution that fall short of satisfying the basic human needs of the
opposing sides are doomed to failure.6 In deep-rooted intractable conflicts, the official
diplomacy approach must be re-assessed and expanded. Social-psychological approaches

4 “The Art of Peace,” On Being. Interview with John Paul Lederach by Krista Tippett.
American Public Media, January 12, 2012.
5 Ronald J. Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution, 19.
6Ibid., 6.
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to of conflict resolution need to become a part o f the peace process since they address the
deep-rooted issues preventing the parties to reach an agreement.

Nagorno-Karabakh: A Brief Overview of an Intractable Conflict
The intractable conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh epitomizes a deep-rooted conflict that has escaped resolution for
decades despite the continual negotiation and mediation efforts o f representatives of the
international community. The intercommunal hostilities erupted in 1988 while the two
sides were still part of the Soviet Union. In a way the rise o f the Armenian nationalist
movement in Nagorno-Karabakh was the beginning of the end o f the vast communist
n

empire. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ethnic frictions quickly escalated to a
war between two independent nations, which resulted in the loss o f over thirty thousand
o

lives and over one million refugees from both sides. The Armenian-Azerbaijani war over
Nagorno-Karabakh is often referred to as one o f the “frozen” Caucasus conflicts,9
because the parties remain deadlocked in their pursuit of an agreement and their
implacable attitude and hatred have endured for over twenty years.

n

Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War
(New York: New York University Press, 2003), 9.
o

Aytan Gahramanova, “Peace Strategies in “Frozen” Ethno-territorial Conflicts:
Integrating Reconciliation into Conflict Management: The Case o f Nagorno-Karabakh .”
(Working Paper, Mannheim University, 2007), 7.
9 U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The
Caucasus: Frozen Conflicts and Closed Borders, hearing, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., June 18,
2008. (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008), 1.
5

A careful examination of latest developments reveals that matters have been
escalating, despite the international diplomatic efforts for a political solution and the
1994 ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia. That agreement did not lead to a peace
deal, because it left Nagorno-Karabakh as well as about 16% o f Azerbaijani territory
around the enclave in Armenian hands.10 Since then, both sides have had soldiers killed
in sporadic breaches of the truce, and a simmering stalemate has prevailed, confirming
Burton’s theory that “deep-rooted conflicts cannot be contained or suppressed in the long
term.” 11 The Azeri resent the loss of land they regard as rightfully theirs, while the
Armenians who have lived there as an ethnic majority for centuries, believe that they are
mitigating a historical injustice, and therefore, show no sign o f willingness to give it
back.12 As a response to the lost territory, Azerbaijan and its strongest ally, Turkey,
closed off their borders with landlocked Armenia which greatly stifles the Armenian
econom y.13
Understanding the geo-political, historical, religious and economic background of
the primary actors of the conflict is the first step o f the analysis that can clarify their
underlying human needs. Fluency in regard o f the main actors and a comprehensive

10 Gahramanova, 7.
11 Ronald J. Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution, 6.
12 Thomas Ambrosio, “Conressional Perceptions of Ethnic Cleansing: Reactions to the
Nagomo-Karabagh War and the Influence of Ethic Interest Groups,” The Review o f
International Affairs, Vol. 2, no.l (2002): 30.
13 Behliil Ozkan, “Who Gains From the “No War No Peace” Situation? A Critical
Analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” Geopolitics 13 (2008): 586.
6

evaluation of their underlying human needs is essential for an effective conflict resolution
process.

Nagorno-Karabakh: A Profile of a De Facto State
Nagorno-Karabakh is a small, internationally unrecognized and isolated, de facto
state situated in the mountainous lands o f the South Caucasus in Eurasia. Its territory is
4,457 square miles (11,500 square km )14. The region has a strategic location between the
Black and the Caspian seas, on the crossroads between Turkey and Central Asia, Russia
and the Middle East. See Appendix A and Appendix B. In addition to its important geo
political location, the fruitful soil and plentiful water resources o f the land make it very
appealing, especially since it is situated between two arid plains.15
Thomas de Waal is a senior associate in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the
Carnegie Endowment who visited the war-tom region and interviewed numerous
individuals on both sides. He explains how “two versions o f history collided” there, and
“to hear Armenians and Azerbaijanis tell it, this was the fault line between Christians and
Muslims, Armenians and Turks, west and east.” 16 Nagorno-Karabakh’s history is

14 “Country Overview.” Office o f the Nagorno Karabakh Republic in the USA. [on-line];
accessed 3 Jan. 2012; available from
http ://www.nkrusa. org/country_profile/overview.shtml.
15 Thomas De Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2010),101.
16 De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, 3.
7

contested between Armenians and Azeri with the rise o f their nationalistic movements.

17

Populated for centuries by a majority o f Christian Armenians and a minority o f Muslim
Turkic Azeri, the region of Nagorno-Karabakh has been plagued by violence and
resentment between the two ethnic groups only since the time o f Russian czarist rule over
the area.18 Until then, the two ethnic groups coexisted in relative peace, sharing numerous
elements of common culture despite their religious differences.19 Both peoples place
significant cultural and symbolic importance on Nagorno-Karabakh,

and both sides

argue that their adversaries were merely temporary occupiers o f the territory. Even
though there were population shifts in the region over the years, there has always been a
strong Armenian presence and there are numerous medieval Armenian churches and
monasteries. Armenian princes ruled this land for centuries and held their autonomy even
when the rest of the ancient Armenian lands fell under foreign rule. As some scholars
point out, the Karabakh Armenians “have resisted against wind and tide to preserve their
identity, waiting for the hour when Armenia would revive.”

On the other hand,

Azerbaijanis view the region as their cultural cradle, the birthplace o f their famous poets

17

Phil Gamaghelyan, “Rethinking the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Identity, Politics,
Scholarship,” International Negotiation 15 (2010): 37-39.
18 Ruben Harutunian, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Moving from Power Brokerage
to Relationship Restructuring,” International Negotiation 15 (2010): 58.
19 De Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction, 100.
20

De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, 3.

21

Levon Chorbajian, Patrick Donabedian and Claude Mutafian. The Caucasian Knot:
The History and Geo-Politics o f Nagorno-Karabagh. (London: Zed Books, 1994), 171.
8

and musicians.22 According to an independent minority rights organization, both sides’
claims have certain validity:
In pre-modem times the region is thought to have formed part o f Caucasian
Albania (no relation to the Balkan Albania), a now extinct culture that had
converted to Christianity in the fourth century and had assumed some Armenian
cultural traits. In the early mediaeval period, waves of Seljuk invasions
contributed to the spread of Islam and Turkic culture in the lowland areas o f
Karabakh. Through the early modem period a mixed system o f rule obtained in
the region, combining jurisdictions o f Muslim khans and Armenian meliks
(princes). To Armenians the region was known as Artsakh. Overall sovereignty
over Karabakh belonged to the Persian empire (Iran) until 1813, when the region
was formally incorporated into the Russian empire.23

Even the name of these highlands exemplifies the numerous cultural influences on
the region and its ethnic diversity. The ancient Armenian name for the enclave is

“Artsakh” but since the fourteenth century it became known by the Turko-Persian fusion
“Kara-Bakh” which depicts its fertile so il.24 “Kara” means “black” in Turkish, and

“bakh” is “garden” in Persian. The Russian adjective “nagorno” means “mountainous.”
The rivalry between the various ethnic groups in the South Caucasus is not new, but the
current ethno-territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has lasted too long,
being fueled by Azeri ultra-nationalism that joined Armenian ultra-nationalism as an
ideology based in hatred of the other.

9S

99

~ Gamaghelyan, 39.

9^

“World Directory of Minorities: Nagorny Karabakh (Unrecognized State) Overview,”
Minority Rights Group International, [on-line]; accessed 23 Mar 2011; available from
http:/Avww.minorityrights.org/?lid=4870&tmpl=printpage.
24 De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, 8.
9S

Thomas Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter’s Adventures in an Oil-rich, Wartorn Post-Soviet Republic. (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 84.
9

After the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in the early 1920s, the new Soviet rulers,
as part of their divide-and-rule policy in the region, established the Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Region, with an ethnic Armenian majority, within the Soviet Socialist
Republic of Azerbaijan.

9A

It is well-known that one o f Stalin’s notorious nicknames was

“Breaker of Nations.” Clearly, the geography and the demography o f the region have
been mismatched for a long time threatening the fundamental human needs for the
Armenians there. The frictions between Armenians and Azeri were kept under control in
the years of authoritarian Soviet control, but the tensions lingered and the issues
remained. The Karabakh Armenians sent petitions to Moscow asking to be united with
Soviet Armenia in 1945, 1965 and 1977 but their efforts were fruitless.27 Finally, in 1988
as a result of the weakening of the Soviet Union, the Nagorno-Karabakh's parliament
voted to secede and join Soviet Armenia and the violence exploded. The Azeri
parliament’s response was to abolish the autonomous status o f Nagorno-Karabakh,
dividing its territory among the surrounding districts.

The Soviet Union initially sent

troops to the region supporting the Azerbaijani defense forces and seeking to eliminate
the growing Armenian paramilitary in Karabakh." When the Soviet Union ceased to
exist and the Russian troops withdrew, the situation worsened for Azerbaijan. Soon the
conflict escalated into a full-scale war between the Azerbaijani armed forces and the
9A

Svante Cornell, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” Department o f East European
Studies: Uppsala University, 1999, [on-line]; accessed 3 Mar 2011; available from
http://www.silkroadstudies.Org/new/inside/publications/l 999_NK_Book.pdf, 1.
27

De Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction, 105.

28 Cornell, 27.
29 Ibid., 25.
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Armenian secessionists in Karabakh, who were supported by the Armenian army and
1A

volunteers from the Armenian Diaspora.

Taking advantage o f internal political chaos in

Baku, the Armenians gained control o f Nagorno-Karabakh and pushed on to occupy
Azerbaijani territory outside the region, creating a thin corridor between Armenia and
Karabakh and establishing a large buffer zone. See Appendix B. The occupied lands
comprise of approximately 16% of the territory o f Azerbaijan. The military offenses
caused a loss of lives o f over thirty thousand people and over one million refugees as the
ethnic Azeri population fled Karabakh and Armenia, while ethnic Armenians fled the rest
of Azerbaijan.

See Appendix C.

On December 10, 1991, after a referendum which was boycotted by its Azeri
population, Nagorno-Karabakh declared itself an independent republic. That status is not
recognized by any other country and most international organizations and countries still
consider it to be a region within Azerbaijan, currently occupied by Armenia. As Cornell
points out, “for every practical purpose, Nagomo Karabakh has become a part of
Armenia - On the border between Armenia and what used to be parts o f Azerbaijan, there
is no demarcated border or passport controls. Officials even admit that in the economic
and financial field, Karabakh and Armenia are actually one entity, just as their unified
budget.”

In a recent interview, Nagorno-Karabakh’s representative to the United States,

Vardan Barseghian, said, “There is no going back for us. Just because Stalin gave

30 Ibid., 33.
n1

Gahramanova, 103.

32 Cornell, 44.
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Karabakh to Azerbaijan does not mean that the international community has to reinforce
what Stalin did.”33
Despite its great dependency on Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
(NKR) is a de facto presidential democracy with a multi-party system and regular
presidential and parliamentary elections. Since 2007, the NKR President has been Bako
Sahakyan. Independent international groups warn that “the demography o f the NKR is a
politicized subject and all statistical data needs to be treated with caution,” but most
estimates concur that the population is over 130,000 and the overwhelming majority are
Christian Armenians.34 Mainly due to the Azerbaijani’s refusal, the de facto NagornoKarabakh authorities do not participate directly in the negotiations regarding the conflict,
even though they are sometimes visited by the international mediators during their shuttle
diplomacy efforts.

Armenia: A Brief Country Profile
The national narrative of Armenia describes it as a country with ancient history,
culture and traditions that have persevered for millennia despite scores o f conquests from
various invaders. Armenians often recollect the past, when the country was a powerful

33 Thomas Cromwell, “Nagorno-Karabakh: ‘There Is No Going Back for Us,” Diplomatic
Traffic, [on-line]; accessed 3 Mar 2011; available from
http ://diplomatictraffic. com/highlights_archi ves.asp? ID= 163.
34 “World Directory of Minorities: Nagorny Karabakh (Unrecognized State) Overview.”
35 Shannon O ’Lear and Robert Whiting, “Which Comes First, the Nation or the State? A
multiple scale model applied to the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the Caucasus,”
National Identities, Vol. 10, no. 2 (2008): 188.
12

empire stretching over a vast territory, including present-day Azerbaijan. Below is a
typical Armenian account of history:
One of the world's oldest civilizations, Armenia once included Mount Ararat,
which biblical tradition identifies as the mountain that Noah's ark rested on after
the flood. It was the first country in the world to officially embrace Christianity as
its religion (c. 300)... Under Tigrane the Great (fl. 95-55 c.c.e.) the Armenian
empire reached its height and became one o f the most powerful in Asia, stretching
from the Caspian to the Mediterranean Seas.36

The first Armenian Kingdom was founded in 6th century B.C., but over the centuries
Armenia was conquered by Greeks, Romans, Persians, Byzantines, Mongols, Arabs,
Ottoman Turks, and Russians.37 Thomas de Waal explains the significance o f NagornoKarabakh for Armenians as “the last outpost o f their Christian civilization and historic
haven of Armenian princes and bishops before the eastern Turkic world begins.”

Just

like in Nagorno-Karabakh, the land is home to numerous Armenian churches and
monasteries, some of which date to the 4th century. Between the 17th and the beginning of
the 20th centuries, in the hands of the Ottoman Turks, the Armenian population was
subjected to the worst oppression in their turbulent history. According to one scholar the
most tragic event in the nation’s history is “the Armenian Genocide of 1915 in Ottoman
Turkey, in which the entire Armenian population o f Anatolia was destroyed.”

The

question of the Armenian genocide is an emotionally charged issue in modem

36 “Discover Armenia,” Embassy of the Republic o f Armenia, Washington, D.C. [on
line]; accessed 3 Mar 2011; available from http://www.armeniaemb.org/index.htm.
37 Gamaghelyan, 37.
38 De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, 3.
Gamaghelyan, 38.
13

international relations, since Turkey denies that it ever took place.40 It has hindered the
latest negotiations for the normalization o f relations between Armenia and Turkey, just as
much as the failed mediation efforts for settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Diplomatic efforts to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey in recent years
have surged, but they have been unsuccessful so far.

In recent history, Armenia declared its independence from the USSR on August
23, 1991. It occupies territory of 11,494 square miles (29,770 square km).41 It is a
presidential representative democracy with a multi-party system. The current president,
Serge Sargsyan, who came to power in 2008 after controversial elections, has weak
credibility at home.42 Armenia has a population o f 2.9 million from which 97% are
Christian Armenians43, but it has a very large Diaspora. Armenia is a land-locked country
and its economy suffers greatly due to its closed border with Turkey. According to the
experts, “The World Bank studies show that an opening o f the borders by Turkey and
Azerbaijan is especially in the interest for Armenia, whose trade could increase the GDP

40 Ibid.
41 “Armenia,” The CIA WorldFactbook, 22 Mar. 2012, [on-line]; accessed 3 Apr. 2012;
available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/ geos/am.html.
42 “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War,” International Crisis Group, 8 Feb. 2011,
[on-line]; accessed 3 Mar 2011; available from
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/caucasus/B60-armenia-and-azerbaijanpreventing-war.aspx, 11.
43 “Armenia,” The CIA World Factbook.
14

by 30%.”44 The country is poor when it comes to natural resources and the estimated
GDP for 2011 was $9.8 billion.45 Armenia receives a significant amount o f foreign aid
from the United States and the European Union. According to its budget, it planned to
spend some $390 million on the army in 2011. Some analysts estimate that the total
defense figure, counting Nagorno-Karabakh’s, is closer to $600 million 46

Azerbaijan: A Brief Country Profile
The national narrative of the Azerbaijani explains that even though the Republic
of Azerbaijan first came into existence in the nineteenth century, the Azeri people have a
rich history going back for centuries. As one scholar describes:

By some accounts, Azerbaijani identity consolidated in the 17th—19th centuries,
while others trace it as a distinct identity group going back to the 10th century or
earlier.... This discrepancy might have to do with the fact that the Muslim groups
in the Ottoman and Persian Empires, although they had many distinct features
such as culture and language, did not have a tradition o f describing themselves in
present-day ethnic terms and had one overarching Muslim identity.47
Azerbaijani lands have been invaded by numerous empires for millennia as well.
Similarly to the Armenians, the Azeris proudly recall their past control over the region.
The following quote is an example o f the national rhetoric:

In the 7th century, Muslim Arabs invaded Azerbaijan introducing Islam to the
Caucasus... Azerbaijan became a part o f the Seljuk Empire in the 11th century.
Under the Seljuk rule, the immigration o f Turkic tribes further strengthened the
44 Gahramanova, 103.
45 Armenia,” The CIA World Factbook.
46 “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War,” 12.
47 Gamaghelyan, 38.
15

ancient and already dominant Turkic presence in Azerbaijan.. .Between 1501 and
1736 the Azerbaijani Sefevi dynasty, founded by Shah Ismayil Khatai, ruled Iran
and neighboring countries, including Azerbaijan. Among the 19 semi-independent
entities, such as khanates and sultanates, which emerged following the fall o f the
Sefevi dynasty, were the Azerbaijani khanates o f Karabakh with the capital in
Shusha and the khanate of Iravan with the capital in Iravan (Erevan, the capital of
modem Armenia).48
Azerbaijan is the largest and most populous state in the South Caucasus. Its entire
territory is 33,436 square miles (86,600 square km). It is a nation with a majority Turkic
Azeri (90%) population of 8.8 m illion.49 Their shared Turkic origins make Azerbaijan
and Turkey closely related culturally and linguistically. However, the Azeris have strong
cultural ties with Iran because 93% of them are Shia Muslims. Azerbaijan declared its
independence from the USSR on October 18, 1991.50 It is a secular country, which holds
elections for President and Parliament every five years, but political opposition is largely
suppressed and the same party and family have been in power since 1993. The current
president Ilham Aliyev succeeded his father in 2003. Azerbaijan has many oil wells in the
Caspian Sea, and it is a strong oil exporter in the region. Several important oil and gas
pipe lines run from Azerbaijan to neighboring countries, carefully going around Armenia.
Azerbaijan had an estimated GDP for 2011 o f $68.5 billion.51 Its official defense

4.8

“Historical Background: A Rich, Proud and Diverse Foundation,” Embassy o f
Azerbaijan, Washington, D.C., [on-line]; accessed 3 Mar 2011; available from
http ://az embassy. us/new/pages.phpVname^Hi story.
49“Azerbaijan,” The CIA WorldFactbook, 21 Mar. 2012, [on-line]; accessed 3 Apr. 2012;
available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/aj.html.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
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spending has risen significantly in recent years, with an average annual increase
approximating 50%, from $135 million in 2003 to $3.12 billion today.52
Since the military defeat by the Armenians and the loss o f its territorial integrity,
the Azerbaijani population has developed a deep sense o f victimization, and making
concessions to the enemy has been viewed as impossible.

Certainly, the minority of

Karabakh Azeri, who were forced out from their homeland during the war, have a right to
identity, dignity, security, equity, voice, and self-determination just as much as the
majority of Karabakh Armenians do. Satisfying these basic human needs of both sides
seems like an unattainable task, but that is in the core o f the conflict resolution. In order
to achieve it, Armenians and Azeri need to fundamentally change their policies and
approaches to peace at the societal level. In the chapter that follows, the comprehensive
analysis focuses on the social-psychological dimensions of the conflict following Herbert
Kelman’s framework for examining international behavior.

52 “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War,” 12.
53

Tabib Huseynov, “Mountainous Karabakh: New Paradigms for Peace and
Development in the 21st Century.” International Negotiation 15 (2010): 11.
17

Chapter 2
Social-Psychological Factors Driving and Perpetuating the Conflict
Herbert Kelman has spent most of his academic career at Harvard where he has
worked in the fields of Social Ethics, Political Psychology, International Conflict
Analysis and Resolution. As Ronald Fisher points out, Kelman’s “ground-breaking
efforts to develop social psychology o f international relations and to apply socialpsychological concepts to the analysis and resolution o f conflict, have placed him at the
center o f developments in interactive conflict resolution.”54 The social-psychological
scholar makes four key observations regarding the nature o f international conflict. This
chapter applies his conclusions in the context of the Armenia-Azerbaijan multifaceted,
protracted conflict.

Nagorno-Karabakh: Conflict as a Process Driven by Collective Needs and Fears
According to Kelman, “international conflict is a process driven by collective
needs and fears, rather than entirely a product o f rational calculation o f objective national
interests on the part of the political decision makers.”55 The lack o f fulfillment of basic
human needs and the collective fears from threats o f these fundamental needs are
powerful forces that fuel the conflict, turning it into a battle for group survival. Just like
other intra-ethnic conflicts, the fight over Nagorno-Karabakh is seemingly over territory

54 Ronald J. Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution, 56.
55 William I. Zartman, 64.
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and resources, but it also reflects and magnifies underlying concerns about security and
identity.56
Azerbaijanis view the loss of their territory as a severe threat to their nationhood
and sovereignty. They claim that the conflict is a result o f the Armenian quest for
expansion and land-grabbing ambitions against its Turkic neighbors. The Azeri contend
that the Armenians massacred entire towns and villages as part o f their ethnic cleansing
offensive during the Karabakh war which resulted in over one million refugees in
Azerbaijan.

With the resolution of the conflict far from sight, Azeri refugees fear they

will never be able to return to their homeland to live in safety and dignity next door to
their Armenian neighbors. The same existential fears are shared by the thousands
Armenian refugees who fled Azerbaijan during the hostilities between the two nations.
The refugees on both sides see themselves as victims and feel marginalized by the narrow
and closed peace negotiation process.
Armenians deny the Azeri’ ethnic cleansing claims and “view the fight for
Karabakh as one to preserve their unique Armenian Christian culture, as revenge for the
1915-18 genocide at the hands of the Turks, and for anti-Armenian violence in
CO

Azerbaijan.”

Nevertheless, the sense that their identity, security, and existence are at

stake contributes to their separatist inclination, resistance to negotiation, and to conflict
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escalation and perpetuation. Despite the fact that they have been the ethnic majority in
the region, the Karabakh Armenians felt that their culture and religion were suppressed
by Azerbaijan during the Soviet era. The Azeri “discount Armenian claims o f cultural
and religious repression, noting that their Turkic culture also had been fettered by
Russification and communism.”59 They also think that the Armenians are satisfied with
the status quo as military victors in full control o f Nagorno-Karabakh and several
adjoining provinces, and therefore, are unwilling to break the impasse. However, the
government of Nagorno-Karabakh which has been denied access to the peace negotiation
table due to Azerbaijan’s objections claims that its absence is an underlying factor for the
deadlock.60 There is a lack of trust, and certainly, it is difficult to sell any negotiated
proposition to a community that has not been included in the negotiations. Similarly to
the refugees, the Karabakh Armenians feel marginalized and frustrated by the lack of
voice when it comes to their own destiny. One independent observer agrees that the
absence o f the Karabakhis undermines the peace process61 since the fate o f their territory
is at the heart of the conflict.

Nagorno-Karabakh: Conflict as an Intersocietal Process
As Kelman describes, “the parties are often unable to extricate themselves from
the escalatory dynamic, in which they are caught up.”62 The sentiment that their identity,
59 Migdalovitz, 11.
60 O ’Lear, 188.
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security, and existence are in danger contributes to their resistance to change or to engage
in conciliation. Kelman concludes that “conflict is an intersocietal process, not only an
interstate or intergovernmental phenomenon.”

The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has

become an unavoidable part of the daily lives of both communities. Azerbaijanis live
with the painful reality that they were defeated militarily, and a large portion o f their
territory is currently under occupation. In addition, the Azerbaijani exclave of
Nakhichevan has been completely cut off from the rest o f Azerbaijan resulting in
negative socioeconomic consequences.64 The Armenian military victory has had a similar
outcome. The landlocked country suffers from an economic blockade as a consequence
of its closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey.65 Certainly, the harshest daily reality is
experienced by more than a million refugees on both sides who lost everything in the
conflict and have lived for the last twenty years in limbo.
Due to these unfortunate circumstances, the vast public opinion and the collective
moods on both sides support the hostilities. The issue o f Nagorno-Karabakh is a sacred
cause for the opposing parties in the conflict, because the two newly independent
countries were built around it.66 Therefore, any notion of a compromise is viewed as a
betrayal of the national interests. The economic factors and domestic political pressures
affect leaders’ decision-making as well. According to Kelman, “leaders’ attempts to
respond to public moods, to shape public opinion, and to mobilize group loyalties often
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feed the conflict and reduce the options for conflict resolution.”67 The presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan can be characterized as semi-authoritarian leaders who think
that it is best if the general public knows as little as possible about the peace negotiations.
At the same time, the societies are fed “black-and-white views on the conflict, hoping for
a full victory; without a wider constituency pressing for change, the presidents have no
mandate for peace in their negotiations.”68 As a result o f this vicious circle, the stalemate
has prevailed - borders remain closed, regions remain isolated, ceasefire violations occur,
refugees continue to suffer.

Nagorno-Karabakh: Conflict as a Multifaceted Process of Mutual Influence
Kelman’s third observation is that “conflict as a multifaceted process o f mutual
influence, not only a contest in the exercise o f coercive power.”69 During the years
following the ceasefire agreement, Armenia and Azerbaijan “have built alliances and
polarized international attitudes.” Azerbaijan has used its Caspian Sea oil fields to make
friends with the West, and enjoys the support o f Turkey- its powerful regional ally. Key
pipelines supplying oil and natural gas to Europe run through the region, but go around
Armenia which leaves it isolated and economically weaker. The closed Turkey-Armenia
border further exacerbates the economic situation in Arm enia.71 The alliances created by

67 William I. Zartman, 69.
68

De Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction, 129.

69 William I. Zartman, 64.
70

De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, 4.

71 Ibid., 4.
22

Azerbaijan push Armenia to form closer ties with Russia and Iran. The Armenian
Diaspora plays a pivotal role by petitioning governments around the world to back the
Armenian cause. The secondary parties in the conflict exercise strong influence on the
conflict dynamics by supporting one side or the other, and maneuvering to protect their
own interests. In such a multifaceted and intricately connected global environment,
failure to find a solution for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will be disastrous for the
region and the entire international community. The status quo is unsustainable and the
pent-up tensions will eventually erupt more forcefully. A renewed military offensive will
be intense, bloody, prolonged, and will disrupt major energy routes between Asia and
Europe. The grave warning of the International Crisis Group issued in February 2011 is
clear:
An arms race, escalating front-line clashes, vitriolic war rhetoric and a virtual
breakdown in peace talks are increasing the chance Armenia and Azerbaijan will
go back to war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Preventing this is urgent. Increased
military capabilities on both sides would make a new armed conflict in the South
Caucasus far more deadly than the 1992-1994 one that ended with a shaky truce.
Neither side would be likely to win easily or quickly. Regional alliances could
pull in Russia, Turkey and Iran. Vital oil and gas pipelines near the front lines
would be threatened, as would the cooperation between Russia and Turkey that is
79
central to regional stability. Another refugee crisis would be likely.

The Role o f the Secondary Actors: Turkey
Turks and Armenian have been fighting for centuries, and the memory of the
Armenian Genocide in 1915 is still an open wound in the Armenian psyche. As one
scholar points out, “As far as the Caucasus is concerned, the Turkish position has been
heavily determined by its priority to relations with its ‘brother state’, Azerbaijan. Partly
79
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for reasons related to Azerbaijan and its conflict with Armenia, and partly because o f
historic problems dating back to the last decades o f the Ottoman Empire, relations with
Armenia have constantly been below the freezing point.” As o f today, Turkey and
Armenia maintain no diplomatic relationship. Naturally the Turkic Azeri have a strong
regional benefactor in Turkey which imports Caspian oil, and provides military
equipment and advisors to Azerbaijan.74 Turkey has not dared to intervene directly with
military force in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but the closed Turkey-Armenia border
has been extremely detrimental to the Armenian economy and used by Azerbaijan as
leverage during the negotiations. In a prepared statement for a U.S. Congressional
hearing, Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau o f European and Eurasian
Affairs of the U.S. State Department said that besides finding a peaceful solution o f the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, “achieving normal relations between Armenia and Turkey is
another principle concern”75 for the U.S. government. The truce between the two
countries seemed possible in 2009 after the United States played a fine balancing act with
the several sensitive issues plaguing Armenia-Turkey relations. After enormous
diplomatic efforts by the State Department, the foreign ministers o f both countries signed
protocols to reopen their border and establish diplomatic relations. However, the
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governments of Turkey and Armenia have not yet ratified the protocols.76 According to
one expert:
Turkey was insisting on making a linkage between Armenia-Turkey
normalization and the Karabakh conflict that was not in the protocols the two
sides signed in October 2009. That is not because Turkey cares deeply about the
Karabakh issue as such, but it does care about its relations with its Turkic ally,
Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan did enough to lobby in the Turkish parliament and to
threaten Turkey with higher gas prices to dissuade the Turkish government from
pursuing the normalization policy.77

The Role o f the Secondary Actors: Russia
Russia and Iran are Armenia’s strongest supporters. Even though Russia has no
direct border with Armenia, it exports energy to the country, and many believe that it also
provides significant military assistance to Armenia.78 Russia denies that it was involved
directly in the Armenian military offensive against Azerbaijan, but it does maintain a key
Russian military base on Armenian territory. According to the International Crisis Group,
in 2010 Russia’s Gyumri military base agreement was extended till 2044 and modified to
include security guarantees against general threats to Armenian security which will
include any attack from Azerbaijan.79
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Despite its alliance with Armenia, Russia has the important role of a chief
mediator in the conflict. It is fascinating however that, Turkey and Russia have a strong
interest to maintain good diplomatic relations between each other, since both countries
reap significant economic benefits from their improved relationship in recent years.

On

the other hand, Russia’s main goal has been to preserve its pre-eminent dominance in the
Caucasus and prevent the spread of Turkish and Western influences there. All o f these
factors make Russia a rather ambiguous broker o f peace.

The Role o f the Secondary Actors: Iran
Iran is another one of Armenia’s regional allies, mainly due to the Azerbaijani
pro-Western stance. In addition, “whereas the Republic o f Azerbaijan contains roughly
six million Azeri, between 15 and 20 million are estimated to live in Iran.” 81 The Islamic
Republic has felt an influx of Azeri refugees and has concerns o f destabilization o f its
northern territories.82 According to Cornell, Iran is concerned that a strong Azerbaijan
can lead to a secessionist movement by the millions of Azeri in the north, and this fact
has been an important reason for the ambivalence of Iran towards Azerbaijan.83 Even
though in the first few years of the conflict Iran was officially calling for preserving the
integrity of the international borders and condemning the Armenian advancement against
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o4

Azerbaijan,

the new gas pipeline between Armenia and Iran completed in 2006 with
o c

Russian capital investments

speaks otherwise.

The Role o f the Secondary Actors: Georgia
Georgia is officially an Azerbaijani and Turkish ally mainly due to the historical
rivalry between Armenians and Georgians, and the country’s extreme dislike o f Russian
hegemony in the region. However, Georgia has a cooperative relationship with Armenia.
In fact, the flow of goods and people to and from Armenia would be extremely difficult
without the Georgians’ cooperation.

The Role o f the Secondary Actors: The EU and the United States
The European Union and the United States try to maintain neutral roles because
they need to balance the interests of oil-rich Azerbaijan and those o f the strong Armenian
lobby. The significant Caspian Sea oil reserves have ignited the interest o f the West in the
Caucasus, and the United States has shifted its initial position o f backing the Armenian
side. According to one scholar, by the end o f the 1990s “the oil lobby in the US became a
counterbalance to the Armenian lobby in the Congress on issues related to the Caucasus
policy of the US.”

Despite the oil interest however, the strategic geopolitical location of

the region must be an important factor for greater American involvement as well. The
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United States feels that supporting Azerbaijan and Turkey offsets the Armenian-RussianIranian alliance.

The Role o f the Secondary Actors: The Armenian Diaspora
Nevertheless, the Armenian Diaspora plays an important role in the conflict since
it lobbies the governments of countries such as the United States, Russia, and France to
support the Armenian cause.87 In Cornell’s words, “the strong lobbying efforts o f the
Armenian community in the United States, whose influential position in US politics is
well-known, stemming from an impressive level o f organization and lobbying skill as
well as its importance in strategic states.”88 For example, in 1992 the Armenian lobby in
Washington was able to get Congress to enact a law banning all foreign aid to
Azerbaijan, due to its “blockade of Armenia.”

Nagorno-Karabakh: Conflict as an Interactive Process with an Escalatory, SelfPerpetuating Dynamic
Lastly, Kelman characterizes international conflict as “an interactive process with
an escalatory, self-perpetuating dynamic.”90 The region was a province in a large Muslim
country, populated mostly by Christian Armenians. Unfortunately, historical traumas
between Christian and Muslim ethnic groups in the Caucasus serve as points o f reference
87

De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, 4.

88 Cornell, 99.
89Ibid., 99.
90 William I. Zartman, 64.
28

for current events. Kelman explains that conflicting parties manifest particularly strong
tendencies to seek out evidence that confirms negative images o f each other and to resist
evidence that counters these images. People involved in intractable conflict develop a
“worldview that includes their conflict as a central component,” and this passes from one
generation to the next, along with the hostility for the other.91 The current conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan has lasted over 20 years, and an entire generation on
both sides knows the other as “the enemy.” These images are resistant to change and
contribute to the continuance and escalation of conflict.92 Each side views the other as
being the extreme aggressor, while its own actions are characterized as self-defense and
bringing freedom from an unjust oppression.
“In all international conflicts,” the author explains, “the needs and fears of
populations are mobilized and often manipulated by the leadership.”

The needs and

fears o f Armenians and Azerbaijani are serious and real, but the recent belligerent
rhetoric and actions coming from Yerevan and Baku are exacerbating these fears even
more. According to one observer, “neither leadership has taken steps to prepare their
populations for a compromise deal rather preferring to feed them fairytale scenarios.
Karabakh has had a major impact on the two societies strengthening mutual negative
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stereotypes and aggressive rhetoric. The conflict also continues to strongly influence
political life and hold back democratization.”94
Armenians started calling Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied buffer zone
“liberated territories” or “historic Armenian lands” and began settlement activities,
renamed several towns, and even conducted archeological excavations to prove the
ancient Armenian origins in the region.95 Some o f these actions were supported and
financed by the Armenian Diaspora, whose powerful lobby managed to get the U.S.
Congress to approve ten million dollars in direct aid to Nagorno-Karabakh in 2010, in
addition to the millions in aid received by Armenia.96 Yerevan is investing millions of
dollars in the infrastructure of the region, and recently government representatives from
Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia celebrated the opening o f the first in a series of hydroelectric plants in the de facto republic.

In addition, the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities

are seeking direct foreign investments from European countries in order to improve their
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underdeveloped energy and mining sectors.

Needless to say, all o f these actions cause

outrage in Baku and do nothing to ameliorate the conflict.
On the other hand, the Azerbaijani government officials have stepped up their
rhetorically charged statements, military buildup,99 and sanctioned acts o f cultural
vandalism. On numerous occasions the Azerbaijani president has stated that Azerbaijan
has the biggest army in the region and is able to liberate its lands via military means, or
that force is a decisive factor, and Azerbaijan must be aggressive in its policies.100 One
expert reported that in a speech in January 2011, “Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev
repeated that Baku would never allow the establishment o f a second Armenian state on its
lands. He went on to talk about the strength o f the Azerbaijani armed forces and that
Azerbaijan’s defense spending will exceed $3 billion this year.” 101 Some Azeri
government officials have even stated on record that the Armenian capital city of
Yerevan was a present to the Armenians in 1918 which was a big mistake that must be
corrected, and others have called for the complete elimination of Armenians.

Recently,

a representative from Baku threatened to shoot down civilian planes flying to NagomoQO
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Karabakh, if the newly reconstructed airport in Stepanakert is reopened in 2011 as
planned.

As part o f the “history war” offensives, in 2005 Azerbaijan erased Armenian

scripts from an ancient church on its territory claiming they were not authentic, and in
2006 Armenian cultural monuments including thousands o f cross-stones with Armenian
inscriptions from a famous medieval cemetery were bulldozed.104 As Kelman states, “the
discourse in deep-rooted conflicts is marked by mutual delegitimization and
dehumanization.”105
The international mediators of the conflict have repeatedly warned both sides of
the dangers of such provocations and vitriolic statements. The OSCE Minsk Group
mediators have requested on numerous occasions for both sides to withdraw their snipers
from the line of contact, because sniper shootings are the most frequent and deadly
breach o f the ceasefire agreement.106 However, other than blaming each other for the
ceasefire violation, neither side has taken steps to prevent such occurrences. Armenian
and Azerbaijani leaders are facing declining economic conditions in their countries and
strong pressure for domestic political reforms. According to some experts, “with
Armenian parliamentary elections slated for 2011, it is unlikely Yerevan will be able to
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do anything that may be viewed as a concession.” 107 The situation is even more serious in
Baku where recent anti-government protests were met with violence and arrests aimed to
suppress the opposition.

Any concession on Nagorno-Karabakh is not likely in this

political environment, because it may make president Aliyev look weak. Instead of
promoting peaceful resolution of the conflict, the leaders in Yerevan and Baku prefer to
follow the old, established formulas, nationalist rhetoric, and avoid any action that might
weaken their positions. In deep-rooted intractable conflicts it is easier to gather support
for aggression than conciliation.
Trying to find a win-win peaceful solution is extremely challenging in an
intractable conflict environment with its complex dynamics and social-psychological
characteristics. Failure to address the deep-rooted causes o f the conflict and to change the
conflict dynamics is not likely to produce a successful outcome. Track-one diplomatic
efforts are focused only on finding a settlement to the conflict: the status of NagornoKarabakh and the refugees on both sides, withdrawal o f Armenian troops from the
adjoining provinces and so on.109 These official diplomatic efforts have not been effective
so far, because they are not supplemented by track-two diplomacy, which has the tools to
transform the societal attitudes and create a peace-promoting atmosphere. This is one of
the main reasons for the persisting deadlock. The next chapter outlines the main track-one
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approaches to peace and elucidates the efforts and difficulties faced by the international
mediators of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

34

Chapter 3
The International Mediation Efforts
Due to limitations of international law as an instrument for resolving intra-state
conflicts, formal negotiation and mediation have been the most popular alternative
conflict resolution methods in the international arena.110 Crocker, Hampson and Aall
label them as “structuralist paradigms” founded on the principle that the causes of the
conflict are objective, and the parties are willing and capable to find a mutually beneficial
negotiated settlement.111 Track-one framework of conflict resolution utilizes formal
negotiation and mediation methods, conducted by official government representatives.
There are numerous historic accounts of intra and inter-state conflicts which were ended
through official diplomatic talks. Since 1945 mediation efforts have spanned the globe as
attempts to resolve the majority of the world’s violent conflicts.

1 19

Negotiation
One scholar defines negotiations as “microcosms o f international relations.”

113

For example, many international trade agreements, mutual cooperation agreements,
weapons non-proliferation agreements are product o f official government negotiations.
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From a diplomatic perspective, negations can be communications exchanged between
two or more nations’ representatives, in order to find a mutually beneficial solution to
their conflict.114 Negotiations could be positional or principled, interest-based or rightsbased. Some scholars view negotiations as a puzzle to be solved, and others view the
process as a bargaining gam e.115 Regardless o f the type o f the negations approach, the
exchange is influenced by a variety of factors. The nature o f the conflict is the main
aspect determining the negotiations’ dynamic. Other crucial factors include the
relationship between the parties, their cultures and ideologies, their levels o f power and
knowledge, their emotions and experiences, and their alternatives to a negotiated
agreement. Awareness and understanding o f these factors are essential for a successful
international negotiator. The two most important principles presented in Fisher and U ry’s
bestseller Getting To Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, are that negotiators
should separate the people from the problem and that one needs to focus on interests, not
positions.

The interest-based approaches to conflict resolution assume that the opposing
parties remain objective and prefer a win-win negotiations framework. However, the
complex characteristics of intractable conflicts are often obstacles to the application of
these principles. The analysis of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict indicates, that the
parties in conflict are not particularly rational when they believe that their underlying
114Ibid., 112.
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human-needs are threatened. Often bi-lateral negotiations between the adversaries of
intractable conflicts are not possible or are unproductive. Therefore, it is common for a
third party serving as a mediator to be utilized for the negotiating process.

Mediation
According to some scholars, mediation is “an extension and elaboration o f the
negotiation process.”

1 17

Perhaps the most exhaustive definition of mediation in the

international relations context is the one provided by the United States Institute of Peace:

A mode of negotiation in which a mutually acceptable third party helps the parties
to a conflict find a solution that they cannot find by themselves. It is a three-sided
political process in which the mediator builds and then draws upon relationships
with the other two parties to help them reach a settlement. Unlike judges or
arbitrators, mediators have no authority to decide the dispute between the parties,
although powerful mediators may bring to the table considerable capability to
influence the outcome. Mediators are typically from outside the conflict.
Sometimes mediators are impartial and neutral, in other cases they have a
strategic interest that motivates them to promote a negotiated outcome. Mediators
may focus on facilitating communication and negotiation but they also may offer
solutions and use leverage, including positive and negative incentives, to persuade
the parties to achieve an agreement.11
According to Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Ruben, at the ‘heart’ o f international
mediation is the mediator’s effort to influence, to change or to modify the
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communication, experience and expectation o f the disputing parties.119 The goal is to
bring a positive change to the conflict dynamic through analysis o f the parties’ interests,
and suggestions of alternative solutions. The authors explain that the various types of
international mediators: individuals, states, organizations and institutions, all share
similar roles which are framed around these efforts and goals. In their book Bercovitch
and Ruben mention the Stulberg’s theory on the mediators’ roles: a catalyst, an educator,
a translator, a resource-expander, bearer o f bad news, an agent o f reality, and a
scapegoat.120 In every one of these roles, understanding the nature o f conflict and
possessing cultural proficiency are crucial for an effective mediation.

Ripeness and timing are important concepts in international conflict resolution.
Ripeness refers to the readiness of parties to enter the talks and the particular
circumstances conductive to a successful diplomatic process.121 The parties o f the conflict
must realize that a unilateral action will not be advantageous to their cause, and that
refusing to accept a settlement will be more costly. William Zartman labels this condition
as a “hurting stalemate.” 122 The timing aspect is closely connected with the conflict cycle,
and sometimes the ripe moment occurs naturally. Other times, however, the mediators
must coax the parties to the negotiating table through means such incentives or threats
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(carrots or sticks).

The positive incentives can be rewards, promises o f power,

legitimatization, resources, economic help, military assistance and so on. Threats may
include discrediting, penalties, economic sanctions, embargoes, use o f military force, etc.
The ability of the mediators to use their leverage over the parties in conflict is viewed by
some experts as more important than the mediators’ neutrality and objectivity.124

The mediation process itself may vary greatly depending on the type o f mediation
being utilized, the conflict environment, and the relationship between the parties
involved. The mediator o f an intractable inter-state conflict is usually another state or
international organization that has a stake in the region and a shared interest to see the
conflict resolved.

The Role of the OSCE in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict:
The Beginning Stages of the Mediation
Despite its significant resources and conflict resolution expertise, the United
Nations has not been directly involved in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Its role has
been limited to condemning the violence and calling for territorial integrity o f all
countries involved. From the beginning, the mediator’s role was passed on to a new
regional organization which was created at the end of the Cold War- the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), later known as Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).125 The organization undertook the task to resolve
the complicated conflict in 1992, when the British delegate pointed out at the end o f a
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CSCE meeting that two of their newly-accepted members (Armenia and Azerbaijan) are
at war with each other and something must be done about it.

A few days later Belarus

offered its capital for a potential peace conference, and the countries involved in the
mediation process became known as the “Minsk Group.”

The organizational structure

of the CSCE emphasized the equality o f all its members and no country was awarded any
veto powers. Originally some truly neutral and sometimes disinterested countries such as
Sweden, Finland, and Italy were the leading the mediation efforts, and the trust levels
towards the mediators were high.

On the other hand, the chief mediators lacked

motivation, cultural expertise, and historical understanding.

A successful mediation

calls for motivation and commitment not just from the parties in conflict but also from
the mediator. Traditional approaches to mediation assume that conflict parties and a
mediator share one reason for initiating mediation: a desire to reduce, abate, or resolve a
conflict.

The new organization had little experience in conflict resolution, had a small

budget, and had no peace-keeping forces. The governments of Western Europe and even
the United States had very little knowledge o f the South Caucasus and the nature o f the
conflict.
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In addition, during the early 1990s Armenia and Azerbaijan seemed
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disinterested in a negotiated settlement. The moment for peace talks was not ripe yet. The
factors mentioned above undermined the efforts o f the CSCE mediators during this
period, and the results were marginal and ineffective.132

Russia Becomes the Chief Mediator of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
The Russians, on the other hand, had a working relationship with the governments
of Armenia and Azerbaijan, knew the local culture, and understood the underlying issues
for both sides of the conflict. In addition, as a superpower with a categorical influence in
the region, Russia enjoyed significant leverage at the mediation table. Mediation is often
used as a vehicle for extending one’s influence133 and Russia was committed to preserve
the South Caucasus in its own sphere o f control. After a prolonged period o f shuttle
diplomacy, in May 1994 Russia was able to broker a cease-fire agreement between
Armenia and Azerbaijan.134 According to one scholar, “Armenians accepted the Russian
offer because Russia was their close and powerful ally; Azerbaijan accepted it because
Russia was the only country that had enough leverage to pressure Armenians to stop their
1 1C

offensive.”

The agreement is still in force today, even though there have been sporadic

cease-fire violations resulting in casualties on both sides over the years.136 The cease-fire
violations are occurring because there is no neutral peace-keeping force on the front-line
132 Ibid., 475.
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to prevent them. Russia was the only country that made a commitment to deploy a peace
keeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh. According to some experts, the UN and the Western
countries did not volunteer any peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, partly due to being
preoccupied with the raging civil war in the Balkans.

However, Azerbaijan objected to

the part o f the agreement calling for Russian peacekeepers on the line o f contact. Public
opinion in Azerbaijan held the view that the Armenians were able to achieve their
military victory mainly due to Russian military support, even though these allegations
were never independently confirmed.

Nevertheless, the lack o f trust towards the

Russians has been apparent and persistent for years. Russia has played an important, yet
dubious role in the resolution of the conflict. According to one analyst:
Whereas from the beginning, Russia was involved in the Minsk group, it became
increasingly clear that Russia would not allow an international organization to
take its place and hamper its interests in the Caucasus. The Russians sometimes
even actively undermined the peace efforts o f the CSCE as they conducted
1 3Q
parallel unilateral mediation attempts without informing the CSCE.

These actions were extremely counterproductive since “the existence o f parallel
mediation tracks led to the parties’ attempts to play one mediation out against the other to
go ‘forum shopping’.” 140 In order to prevent Russia from conducting its own separate
mediation, the now-renamed Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

137

De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, 239.

138 Gahramanova, 103.
139 Cornell, 122.
140Ibid., 123.
42

(OSCE) elevated Russia’s status to a permanent co-chair o f the Minsk Group with a role
of assisting the rotating organization’s chairman.

The OSCE Minsk Group Troika’s Mediation Efforts
The West finally began to be more coordinated and competent in the NagornoKarabakh conflict in the mid 1990s. During the Lisbon summit in 1996, the OSCE
members nominated France to become Russia’s permanent co-chair o f the Minsk Group
in order to counterbalance the Russian dominance o f the mediation process. Azerbaijan
had objections due to the large Armenian Diaspora in France which could make the co
chair prejudiced against Azerbaijan. A compromise was reached when the United States
and France joined Russia as permanent co-chairs o f the OSCE Minsk Group, despite
Russia’s initials reservations. Currently, the chief international mediators o f the
Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks are the same three countries co-chairs of the OSCE
Minsk Group also known as the OSCE Troika141 (Russian for “threesome”). The other
members of the Minsk Group are Belarus, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan.142 Noticeably, the Islamic
Republic of Iran, which is not an OSCE member state, is the only regional power that has
been excluded from the Nagorno-Karabakh peace mediation process.
According to the OSCE website, the main objectives o f the Minsk group peace
process can be summarized as follows:
141 Ibid., 125.
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Providing an appropriate framework for conflict resolution in the way o f assuring
the negotiation process supported by the Minsk Group;
Obtaining conclusion by the Parties of an agreement on the cessation of the armed
conflict in order to permit the convening o f the Minsk Conference;
Promoting the peace process by deploying OSCE multinational peacekeeping
forces.143
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution approach so far has been a closed-door
mediation between high-ranking representatives o f Armenia and Azerbaijan, being
facilitated by the special Ambassadors o f the OSCE Troika. This type o f formal track-one
diplomacy is necessary, but ineffective on its own. Any potential compromise signed at
the negotiation table would be impossible to implement on the ground, given the reality
of mutual hatred and distrust between the two societies.
In addition, the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh state that no peace deal will be
possible unless they are included in the mediation process.144 Azerbaijan rejects such
prepositions based on fears that giving the Armenian secessionists a spot at the mediation
table may legitimize their claims for sovereignty and statehood. However, some experts
“argue that not taking part in the negotiations gives Nagorno-Karabakh the ultimate veto
right over any compromise” 145 which certainly is a big obstacle in the peace process.
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The Minsk Troika has proposed different peace frameworks over the years, but
none have been deemed acceptable by the opposing sides.146 These include a step-by-step
peace proposal, a “common state” solution, and a Basic Principles plan. Each one of
these frameworks is outlined below. Even when Armenia and Azerbaijan seemed to agree
on principle and got closer to a compromise, the solution was rejected by the NagornoKarabakh leadership, indicating that the Armenians in Yerevan sometimes have different
agendas than those in Stepanakert.147
For example, in 1997 the Minsk group proposed a step-by-step solution to the
conflict, beginning with Armenian withdrawal from the Azerbaijani provinces around
Nagorno-Karabakh and allowing for the refugees to return to their homeland. The next
step of the peace process would have been deciding the status o f Nagorno-Karabakh.
According to some experts, the Armenian president at the time, Levon Ter-Petrosyan,
was leaning towards a compromise, even though the proposal was immediately rejected
by the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. The notion o f giving up the Armenian strongest
bargaining chips without any guarantees for independence o f Nagorno-Karabakh was
political suicide for Ter-Petrosyan, who was forced to step down after losing all public
support.

In the presidential elections that followed in 1998, the majority of Armenians

voted for the former president of the de-facto state o f Nagorno-Karabakh, Robert
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Kocharyan. He was elected for president of Armenia, despite the fact that he was a
citizen of Nagorno-Karabakh and not Armenia.149
The details of the next Minsk group proposal were not made very clear to the
public. According to some analysts, it was a package deal involving a “common state”
solution between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia endorsed this proposal
since that would have meant the recognition o f Nagorno-Karabakh as a state within
Azerbaijan. However, the Azerbaijani leaders immediately rejected this approach stating
that it violates the principles of maintaining the territorial integrity o f their country.150
As Cornell assesses, “By its actions, the Minsk group hence actually increased the
unwillingness of one party to the conflict to make serious compromises.. .An interesting
observation is that the increased involvement of great powers in the mediation process
has worsened rather than promoted the prospects o f a solution.” 151 Perhaps the rivalry
between the interests of the Minsk Troika endures and undercuts their efforts to reach a
common goal. That is often the opinion o f ordinary Armenians and Azerbaijanis who are
frustrated with the lack of progress. It is evident, however, that in the aftermath o f the
failed Minsk group proposals, the leaders o f the opposing sides have stuck to their hard
line positions regarding the status of the region, and pointed fingers at each other for
being unwilling to negotiate in good faith.
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In 2005 the Minsk group mediators began working on a new peace proposal based
on ideas discussed during years of negotiations.152 The latest proposal became known as
the “Madrid principles” since it was introduced at a summit at the Spanish capital in
2007. In Madrid, the Minsk Troika presented the Basic Principles outlined below to the
foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan:
-return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control;
-an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and
self-governance;
-a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh;
-future determination of the final legal status o f Nagorno-Karabakh through a
legally binding expression of will;
-the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former
places of residence; and
- international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping
operation.153

This framework exemplifies a single-text approach to negotiations. The parties are
presented with one document which they must endorse after a series o f revisions if
necessary. Fortunately, the Madrid principles were not immediately rejected by either
side. They have been discussed by the representatives o f Armenia and Azerbaijan since
2007 and numerous amendments were made by both sides. Unfortunately, as o f today
there is still a lack of consensus of the final draft o f the Basic Principles and the peace
process has stalled.
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Recent Mediation Efforts and the Persisting Stalemate
In a candid interview given in May 2010, Thomas de Waal expressed his opinion
that the mediations over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are unfortunately deadlocked:
“Observers of the peace talks have the perception that the Armenian and Azerbaijani
presidents actually prefer the narrowly based desultory peace process, which preserves
the status quo and produces no results, to a more dynamic process that would force them
to take hard decisions and make public compromises to the enemy.” 154 A more recent
report from the International Crisis Group shares this assessment:
Any optimism that remained in 2009 over the framework agreement on basic
principles, evaporated in the second half o f 2010. While Aliyev and Sargsyan met
six times in 2009, they did so only three times in 2010. The shuttle diplomacy by
Minsk Group diplomats, who visited Yerevan, Baku, and the de facto authorities
in Stepanakert sometimes as often as twice a month in 2009, also cooled. Even
though there was an OSCE push to obtain agreement on the basic principles for
the December 2010 summit, the presidents refused to meet each other and made
only a vague commitment to seek a solution based on international legal
principles. 55
Almost twenty years have passed since the unstable ceasefire agreement was
signed by Armenia and Azerbaijan. During this long span o f years, there have been
numerous meetings between the leaders o f the two countries, mediated by the OSCE
Minsk Group co-chairs: Russia, the U.S., and France, but no one seems closer to finding
a peaceful settlement. Despite the discouraging impasse, the international peace efforts
continued. On March 5, 2011 in Sochi, Russia a peace-seeking meeting was attended by
presidents Aliyev and Sargsyan, and mediated by the Russian president Medvedev. There
were no breakthroughs or surprises during the meeting, and the Basic Principles
154 De Waal, “Nagorno-Karabakh and the Minsk Group Negotiations.”
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framework remained unsanctioned. However, the presidents released a statement that
they have agreed to keep searching for a peaceful resolution o f the conflict, and to
exchange prisoners of war as soon as possible.156 The prisoner exchange occurred on
March 17, 2011 as agreed, but it was followed by deadly sniper fire on the line o f contact
the following day. According to some reports, days after the Sochi meeting, the
Azerbaijani Defense Minister “stated that the “worthlessness” o f the Minsk Group talks
had forced Azerbaijan to build up its military capabilities in order to “take serious and
necessary measures to liberate” Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas.”

The next peace mediation meeting was scheduled for June 24, 2011 in Kazan,
Russia, and it was once more hosted by the Russian president. Despite the strongly
worded statement issued at the May 2011 G-8 summit in Deauville, France by Presidents
Obama, Medvedev and Sarkozy, which demanded no further delay in signing the Basic
1 CO

Principles,

the results of the high-level meeting in Kazan were disappointing because

no agreement was reached on the proposed framework. The meeting in Kazan was the
ninth peace mediation between the Russian President and his Armenian and Azerbaijani
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counterparts.159 According to some sources, after the fruitless four hour meeting,
President Medvedev sent letters to the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders asking for
suggestions on how to move the talks forward. The same topic was discussed in Warsaw,
Poland on September 29, 2011 when the Minsk group co-chairs met separately with the
Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents.160
The failed peace efforts call into question the commitment o f the opposing sides
to find a peaceful solution to their conflict through negotiation. It would appear that
neither side has changed its position which remains the core o f the conflict- “the
competing claims of territorial integrity, which Azerbaijan insists takes precedence in the
case of Nagorno-Karabakh, and self-determination, which Armenia wants to see for the
Armenians of Karabakh.” 161 Other difficult issues still on the negotiating table include
the right of the displaced people to return to their homes, and permitting a narrow
corridor linking Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh.162 The ability o f the mediators to
persuade the parties to reach a compromise is also questionable. So far the only role the
international mediators have mastered is the one o f being scapegoats for the failed peace
seeking efforts.
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According to Thomas de Waal, “there are deeper problems with the negotiations:
It is far too narrow a process to get the kind o f traction needed to resolve a major conflict.
There is almost no Track Two process involving the two societies and few international
resources are being expended to support the U.S., French and Russian mediators”.

It is

clear that no peaceful solution is possible without popular support, and yet nothing is
done to change the hostile attitudes and the counterproductive atmosphere on the streets
of Armenia and Azerbaijan. In fact, there is almost no contact between the Armenian and
Azerbaijani societies, and the discussions during the peace mediations are generally not
shared with the public at home. The leaders prefer to keep the peace talks confidential,
and are afraid to make conciliation gestures when it comes to Nagorno-Karabakh,
because the passionate nationalistic rhetoric in Armenia and Azerbaijan portray any
compromise on the issue as a betrayal o f the national interests. Unless there is greater
openness and candid internal dialogue in both countries that may lead to change o f the
mind-sets of the people, the leaders will remain trapped in their current positions. Unless
there are initiatives aimed at encouraging interactions, improving communications, and
building trust between the two nations, no peaceful resolution will be feasible. These are
some of the peace-seeking principles o f the Interactive Conflict Resolution approach,
which is necessary as a complement to the existing formal mediation efforts between
Armenia and Azerbaijan. This track-two non-governmental method o f international
peacemaking is analyzed in the chapter that follows.
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Chapter 4
Interactive Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice
The term Interactive Conflict Resolution was first used in 1997 by Ronald J.
Fisher,164 Director of the International Peace and Conflict Resolution Program in the
School of International Service at American University in Washington, DC. Fisher has
post-bachelor’s degrees in psychology and social psychology, and he has spent most of
his career studying protracted social conflict. According to his profile, developing the
scholar-practitioner field of Interactive Conflict Resolution is his main professional
interest.165

Interactive Conflict Resolution: A Social-Psychological Track-Two Paradigm
Ronald Fisher’s theory of Interactive Conflict Resolution is a part of the
international peacemaking framework which could ameliorate the factors hindering the
efficacy of the official mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Fisher’s model
“involves problem-solving discussions between unofficial representatives o f groups or
states engaged in violent protracted conflict.” 166 Even though a peace agreement could be
reached as a part of the formal mediation process, no peaceful resolution can be
implemented in reality, unless the atmosphere o f the intractable conflict shifts
dramatically. The goals of interactive conflict resolution include improved attitudes and
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understanding, improved relationship, joint generation o f creative solution that may lead
to long-term-conflict resolution and societal reconciliation.

1A7

Ronald Fisher’s model is an essential component o f the quest for peace. It consists
of informal but structured workshops or consultations facilitated by a neutral third party
scholar-practitioner.

A small group o f participants from both sides o f the conflict

gathers for a joint discussion in a neutral and informal setting.169 The participants in these
workshops are not the countries’ presidents or ministers, but they are still influential
figures in the society. Conflict resolution experts believe that “the approach seems to
work best if individuals are middle-range elites such as academics, advisers, ex-officials,
or retired politicians who continue to have access to those in power.”

As Bercovitch

and Jackson point out, “the underlying assumption is that increased communication and
understanding between middle-level leaders will permeate both upward to the Track I
level and downward to the level of community reconciliation.” 17'According to
professionals from the conflict resolution community, the multifaceted nature of
intractable conflicts requires “a multidimensional approach involving a range o f actors,
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both official and unofficial.” 172 Some scholars go even further in their conclusions stating
that in identity-based intractable conflicts, where fundamental human needs are at stake,
utilizing traditional methods of conflict resolution such as mediation “may exacerbate
and prolong the conflict.”173 Fisher elaborates:
Workshops provide an opportunity for influential representatives of the parties to
engage in a mutual analysis o f the social-psychological aspects o f their conflict
(images, needs, interaction patterns, escalation processes, ideologies, institutions)
and to connect these to policymaking and public opinion. The intense, face-toface interaction provides authentic information that can shift attitudes in a more
realistic and less stereotyped direction.174

Improving the participants’ attitudes, perceptions, patterns o f behavior, and
communication channels are the main goals of the interactive conflict resolution
workshops. “By altering the psychological climate between the antagonists,” 175 in time,
the neutral scholar-practitioners would be able to transform the existing stalemate into a
constructive and problem-solving dialogue.
The identity of the third party consultant is o f great importance for the successful
interactive conflict resolution model. According to Fisher, “the third party needs to
possess professional expertise and knowledge, moderate knowledge about the conflict,
and be perceived as impartial.” 176 Substantive comprehension about the underlying issues
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of the conflict is essential. In addition to their competence level, the author discusses
other requirements for the third party consultants, such as their high ethical standards,
integrity, strong sense for social responsibility, and respect o f people’s rights and
dignity.

Finally, an effective third party consultant should be creative and culturally

fluent. In Fisher’s interactive conflict resolution model, the third party consultants are
usually scholar-practitioners from a variety of professional disciplines such as
psychology, psychiatry, sociology, law, international relations, political science, etc.178
The roles of the third party consultants are facilitative and diagnostic. Similar to
mediators, the interactive conflict resolution scholar-practitioners “induce positive
motivation, improve communication, diagnose the conflict, and regulate the
interaction.” 179
Fisher emphasizes that interactive conflict resolution is not a substitute for formal
international mediation, but a complementary approach which could be utilized during
the various stages of peace negotiations.180 As part o f the pre-negotiation, negotiation,
and post-negotiation phases, the interactive workshops aim to achieve “deep
understanding, mutual recognition and respect, and jointly acceptable and sustainable
solutions.”

Harold Saunders, who has extensive experience in both official and

unofficial conflict resolution roles, contends that peace cannot be achieved by relying
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solely on the negotiation and mediation efforts between government representatives.182
Comprehensive and sustainable peace could only be attained through transformation of
the relationship between the societies. Therefore the process o f peacemaking must
involve informal communication between influential citizens o f the opposing sides.
Bringing together representatives o f the conflicting sides for a problem-solving
dialogue could influence positive change o f perceptions and attitudes and improve the
relationship of the parties. According to Fisher, at first the guided interaction brings
positive transformation on a small scale directly to the participants in the workshop, but
eventually the interactive conflict resolution approach would be effective in dealing with
many of the subjective aspects of the conflict on a larger scale.183

Assessment of the Effectiveness of Interactive Conflict Resolution
Some critics of Ronald Fisher’s theory claim that the social-psychological
approach of conflict resolution is not practical and effective. Bercovitch, for example,
considers the problem-solving workshops as “interesting exercises, but irrelevant and
unsuccessful - largely because they do not conform to his view o f mediation.” 184 Because
interactive conflict resolution workshops are not solution-oriented, and do not involve
high-ranking government officials, their practical utility is questioned. Fisher explains
that interactive conflict resolution and mediation are similar, but they do not have the
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same objectives. Mediation facilitates the opposing parties to uncover a mutuallyagreeable solution, while the third-party consultation is focused on the problem-solving
process, which is facilitated through open communication and analysis o f the underlying
issues of the conflict. Another expert contends that such goals are too broad and
impossible to evaluate.185

According to the critics, it is difficult to demonstrate how improved
communications and attitudes between workshops’ participants translate into improved
conditions between the societies, and lead to a peaceful conflict resolution.186 Another
expert in the field points out the “need to formulate, and to develop methodologies to
examine, theoretical connections among current intervention techniques, microobjectives
in the problem-solving workshop, and macrogoals o f changing the dynamics of
conflict.”

Fisher agrees that his theory can benefit from further research and

evaluation. He explains that the effectiveness o f the problem-solving workshops is
somewhat dependent on the support they receive from government officials, and the level
of coordination between track-two and track-one approaches o f conflict resolution is
essential.

Unfortunately, many representatives in official diplomatic circles have

historically perceived track-two practitioners to conflict resolution as “meddlers” who
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“raise unrealistic expectations, cause misunderstandings or interfere in other ways with
the official process.” 189 Only since the end o f the Cold War, some diplomats started to
recognize the potential o f supplementing their official efforts with track-two approaches
to conflict resolution.190

However, skeptics declare that the problem-solving workshops could become a
forum for disagreements and expression o f profound differences between the parties
which could be counterproductive to the peace process.191 Fisher refutes these claims by
stating that, “interactive problem solving is based on a careful analysis o f the relationship
of workshops to the policy process, but it takes a broad view o f that process.”192 The
communication exchanges at workshops are controlled and the parties’ differences “can
be explored and potentially reconciled.” 193 He also points out that all diplomatic efforts
are done on interpersonal level, and the fact that the workshop participants do not interact
in an official capacity is actually a significant advantage.194 The lack o f formal
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constraints is conductive to greater transparency and adoption o f creative ideas, even
though the official support of the workshops has a positive effect on their utility. 195

Fisher concurs with the skeptics that there are several deficiencies regarding his
method. There is not enough empirical data indicative o f the efficacy o f the approach,
mainly due to the informality the process and the absence o f well-defined goals.
According to one expert:

Without clearly predesignated expected outcomes and reasonably established
means (both theoretical and empirical) to explain how these outcomes could be
achieved, unofficial intervention is doomed to the status o f double marginality: it
will neither be taken seriously by policy makers and practitioners o f the official
diplomatic track nor will it succeed to become established as an academic
discipline.196
In addition, there are not enough funding and organizational structures which support the
scholar-practitioners in terms of their research, training and practice.197 All o f these
factors hinder the interactive conflict resolution development and growth.

Comparative Case Analysis of Successful Interactive Conflict Resolution Workshops
However, despite the above-mentioned deficiencies, the interactive conflict
resolution model has been used successfully as a part o f the international peacemaking
framework for years. Variations of Ronald Fisher’s approach were applied to deep-rooted
conflicts where official mediation efforts had reached a deadlock due to the reluctance of
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the representatives to negotiate about their peoples’ identity, human dignity, historic
grievances, security, and so on. The application o f the interactive conflict resolution
theory to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the civil war in Tajikistan, the MoldovaTransdniestria conflict, and the Peru-Ecuador war is indicative o f the model’s potential.
These cases are examples of deep-rooted, violent, intractable conflicts which erupted
after the disintegration of the colonial powers that used to be in control o f the respective
regions. Despite the cultural and geographical diversity o f the cases, they share common
underlying issues and grievances that were not addressed solely by track-one diplomacy.

The protracted ethno-political conflicts have similar social-psychological
dynamics and characteristics to those of the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict over NagornoKarabakh. The society’s collective needs and fears regarding treats to their identity,
security and dignity make the conflict intractable. These psychological factors are not
interest-based, and they impose perceptual cognitive constraints on processing o f new
positive information. The collective moods and public opinion are difficult to manipulate
because the conflict and the hatred against the enemy have become part o f the daily life
and national narrative. Conflicting parties manifest particularly strong tendencies to seek
out evidence that confirms negative images o f each other and to resist evidence that
counters these images.

As a result, an intractable conflict embodies an interactive

process with escalatory and self-perpetuating dynamic.199 The underlying socialpsychological factors tend to reinforce and deepen the conflict. However, the
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peacemakers in the four cases infra, employed the interactive conflict resolution model to
reverse the intractable conflicts’ dynamics which led to positive transformations between
the societies and successful conflict resolutions.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Herbert Kelman is a scholar-practitioner whose work for decades has been
focused on one of the world’s well-known conflicts. One scholar describes the IsraeliPalestinian conflict an “archetypical example o f an intractable conflict: a protracted,
violent, drawn-out struggle in which generation after generation is socially conditioned to
continue fighting.”200 According to Kelman and Fisher:
The roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict go back for more than a century to the
birth of political Zionism and the growing Jewish presence in Palestine, which
was perceived as a threat by the Arab population. Intergroup violence began in the
1920s and was accelerated by the failed United Nations partition plan and the
establishment of Israel in 1948, leading to the first war between Israel and its
Arab neighbors, which resulted in the displacement o f hundreds o f thousands of
Palestinian refugees. Subsequent wars in 1956, 1967, and 1973 established Israeli
dominance, with the 1967 war resulting in the acquisition o f the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, in addition to the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. This war
also brought about the Palestinianization o f the Arab-Israeli conflict, rendering it
back into a conflict between two peoples over the same land.201
The parallels between the Israeli-Palestinian and the Armenian-Azerbaijani
conflicts are obvious. The conflict is seemingly over territory, but the underlying factors
fueling the hostility are those of identity, dignity, security, historical narratives, and so
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on, which are defined by racial, ethnic, religious and cultural group affiliations. The
important geo-political location of the conflict has drawn the attention o f the world’s
Great Powers who are heavily involved in the conflict resolution process.
Kelman has organized and facilitated numerous workshops with Israeli and
Palestinian participants of “increasingly greater influence in the politics and public
opinion of their respective societies.”202 He tailored the series o f workshops to meet the
current developments of the conflict and his primary goal was to identify the
“psychological prerequisites for mutual acceptance o f the parties ... and to create the
conditions for negotiations.”203 Once the formal talks began, the focus shifted to
overcoming the obstacles of the track-one diplomatic process.
After the first Palestinian intifada in the late 1980s, formal negotiation and
mediation efforts intensified under the auspices o f the United States and Russia. The
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was excluded from these talks and they
resulted in little progress.204 Consequently, Kelman and his colleagues organized a
continuing workshop with largely the same high-level Palestinian and Israeli participants
that ran from November of 1990 to August 1993.205 Kelman labeled his approach a
“third-party intervention workshop” but it has many o f the features of an interactive
conflict resolution model. According to Kelman, several o f the participants of his
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workshop eventually became members o f the negotiation teams o f the respective sides
and that contributed to “the breakthrough of the Oslo agreement, which included mutual
recognition between Israel and the PLO, and articulated a set o f principles for the
transition to self-rule for the Palestinians.”206 In addition, “the information sharing and
formulation of new ideas on the analysis and resolution o f the conflict yielded important
substantive inputs into the political discourse and into negotiations.”207 The workshops,
along with other track-two facilitation efforts known as the “Norwegian channel”208,
fostered a political atmosphere that was conducive to negotiations and changed the
relationship between the parties. The interactive conflict resolution model contributed to
the sense o f mutual acknowledgement and reassurance o f the opposing parties, and the
realization of the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The signing o f the
Oslo Accord in 1993 was a major breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process,
because it ended the armed conflict between Israel and the PLO, and led to their mutual
recognition and legitimatization.209 Unfortunately, a sustainable peace between Israeli
and Palestinians remains elusive. The Oslo accord was an important first step towards a
lasting conflict resolution, but it was never fully implemented, and the peace negotiations
have deteriorated in recent years. Fisher states that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has
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“low receptivity to intervention” 210 due to the presence o f serious internal and external
factors such as change of political leadership or transnational corporations’ interference,
existence of natural resources or important geo-political location o f the disputed territory.
Interactive conflict resolution is not a mechanism which can address directly these
factors, and they continue to impede the peace process.

The Civil War in Tajikistan
The collapse of the Soviet Union produced several destructive conflicts within
and between the newly emerging independent republics. In 1991, the Central Asian
nation of Tajikistan descended into a civil war between “different ethnicities and
nationalities, clan-based and regional groups, and a mix o f ideologies ranging from
communist to democratic to militant Islam.”211 According to the former diplomat and
current interactive conflict resolution practitioner, Harold Saunders, “the people o f this
fragmented country - formed and held together as a republic only under Soviet rule- had
little sense of national identity.”212 The strong local clan-based identity and religious
affiliations were the most important underlying factors in the fight for power. In that
sense, the conflict is similar to the one over Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition, alike the
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict multiple external regional forces exercised a significant
influence on the developments on the ground.213 Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran
210
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supported the Islamic movement in Tajikistan, while Russian military was involved “to
protect the southern ‘security border’ o f the Commonwealth o f Independent States.”214
The violent clashes in Tajikistan continued for years and resulted in numerous casualties
and refugees.

9 1S

In March 1993 (well before the U.N. sponsored negotiations began) a team of
American and Russian facilitators from the Dartmouth Conference Regional Conflicts
Task Force began an unofficial dialogue between the opposing groups in Tajikistan.216 As
Fisher describes:
Harold Saunders and his colleagues organized a series o f interactive sessions
following a carefully constructed model of sustained dialogue. The sessions
brought together influential highlevel participants from the government and
opposition sides of the conflict, and made numerous contributions to the formal
negotiation process, reconciliation among the antagonists, and the building o f a
civil society in the country.217
Because Saunders perceives the dialogue model as “a public peace process within a
multilevel peace process that also includes the official track, the quasi-official process
and civil society,”218 there was a great coordination of efforts between the formal and
informal diplomatic tracks. The unofficial track-two process was labeled the “Inter-Tajik
Dialogue”, and it included several regular members and some observers who met six
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times a year over a period of a few days.

910

Similarly to the interactive conflict resolution

workshops, the dialogue process focused on the deep-rooted causes o f the conflict and the
relationship between the opposing parties. As one scholar describes:
Between 1993 and 1996, when the political negotiations seemed deadlocked or
often on the verge of collapse, participants in this informal or “track two”
diplomacy continued to provide ideas for both sides in the political negotiations,
including ideas for overcoming attitudes and misconceptions that blocked
progress along the way. These ideas helped both parties in the formal negotiations
to redefine their interests, and to develop new norms and patterns o f behavior, a
shared perception of accord desirability and even possibly a formula for
compromise. They imagined cooperative strategies and generated suggestions for
structuring the options, the negotiation process and strategies.220

Fisher explains that the organizers o f the Inter-Tajik Dialogue sought the approval and
support of the government, and results o f the sessions were shared with the public via a
joint memorandum by the participants in the process.221 Some o f the participants of the
Inter-Tajik Dialogue were members o f the formal negotiation teams.222 The dialogues and
the subsequent information sharing had direct positive effects on the formal negotiation
process, and played an essential role in creating civil society forums and organizations
dedicated to peace-building. These initiatives began gradually to change the political,
social and psychological atmosphere in the country. Thus the work o f Saunders and his
colleagues transformed Tajik society and generated substantial impetus which led to the
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signing of a peace agreement in 1997.223 The Inter-Tajik Dialogue process is a paradigm
of the promising outcomes of harmonizing track-one diplomatic efforts with unofficial
social-psychological approaches to peace-building.

The Moldova-Transdniestria Conflict
Similarly to the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Tajikistan conflicts, the one between
Moldova and the breakaway Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic (Transdniestria)
emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The region is situated between
Romania and Ukraine and it has historically been contested by its neighbors.224 It has
been a part of the Russian Empire till 1918, but later came under Romanian control, and
in 1940 was annexed to the Soviet Union along with a territory on the left bank o f the
Dniester River (Transdniestria) which used to be part o f Ukraine.225 The entire region is
ethnically and linguistically diverse. In Moldova, the majority o f the population is
Moldovan and Romanian speaking, but Ukrainian, Russian and Bulgarian ethnic groups
who speak Slavic languages comprise more than thirty percent of the population. In
Transdniestria, the Slavic ethnic groups have a slight majority over the Moldovan
population.~~ As Moldova declared independence in 1991, Transdniestria declared its

223 Jonathan Zartman, 64.
224

Bernardo Venturi, “Civil Society Organizations and Conflict Resolution: MoldovaT r a n s n is tria International Journal on World Peace, Vol. XXVIII, no.2 (2011): 7.
225

Andrew Williams, “Second Track Conflict Resolution Processes in the Moldova
Conflict, 1993-2000: Problems and Possibilities,” in Paving the Way: Contributions o f
Interactive Conflict Resolution to Peacemaking, ed. R.J. Fisher, 143-160. (Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books, 2005), 145.
226 Ibid.
67

own independence and the war erupted over its political sovereignty.227 Transdniestria is

“defacto independent and provides the region with many visible state-like attributes as
well as a separate "national" identity; however, no other state has recognized it.”228
Moldovan forces entered Transdniestria and were met with resistance by the local forces
supported by Russian troops. The intense fighting which lasted about one year was ended
by a cease-fire in 1992, enforced by Russian and Ukrainian peacekeeping troops.229 There
is a deep ideological divide between the two parties: Moldova is oriented towards
Western Europe, while Transdniestria wants to maintain close connections with
Russia.

230

The Moldova-Transdniestria conflict contains the same underlying issues as

those of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh: identity, dignity, security, selfdetermination, etc.
The official mediators of the Moldova-Transdniestria conflict, the OSCE aided by
special envoys from Russia and Ukraine, began working with the opposing parties in
19937

The same year, informal problem solving workshops sponsored by the Centre for

Conflict Analysis at the University o f Kent, Canterbury, UK, and the Foundation for
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International Security, based in London, began their conciliatory mission.232 The series of
workshops were facilitated by a team o f academic scholar-practitioners, and the
participants were high-ranking representatives o f both governments and negotiators of the
OSCE talks.“ According to Williams, the main goal o f the problem-solving workshops
was to let the participants express their emotions, fears and hopes. Then the discussions
focused on a comprehensive analysis of the conflict, the political status o f Transdniestria,
and issues such as language, economics, education, and currency.234
Fisher explains that the problem-solving workshops were “useful in developing a
shared understanding of the conflict and developing directions and options toward its
resolution.”

Track-two diplomatic efforts were generating dialogue and creative

thinking in the official diplomatic circles as well as the broader civil society on both
banks of the Dniester River. Eventually the discussions “allowed the workshops to move
toward the creation of a constitutional framework under the rubric o f a “common state”
that was articulated in a document acceptable to the participants from both sides.”236
Fisher explains that at the last series o f problem-solving workshops in the MoldovaTransdnestria conflict were hybrids between track-one and track-two diplomacy:
A larger, more conventional problem-solving conference was held in 2000 in
Kiev, with both official and unofficial participants and interveners. This session
232 Ibid.

233 Ibid., 80.
234 Williams, 150.
235

Ronald J Fisher, “Coordination Between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy in
Successful Cases of Prenegotiation,” 80.

236 Ibid.
69

produced a constitutional document, based on the concept o f the common state,
which Williams clearly sees as a result o f the fusion of track-one and track-two
237
processes.
It is evident that the coordination and collaboration between track-one and track-two
approaches to conflict resolution are highly productive. They lead to positive cognitive
changes such as improved attitudes and trust, and positive substantive outcomes such as
innovative peace agreements.

The Peru-Ecuador Conflict
As Ecuador and Peru gained independence from Spanish colonial rule in the early
1800s, they commenced their intra-state conflict over a vast (an area the size o f France)
disputed territory and the location of their common border.238 Diplomatic efforts were
unsuccessful and the two countries engaged in continuous warfare. Similarly to the
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the newly independent countries began to write their own
version of history, usually antithetical to the national narrative o f their enemy.239 Fisher
summarizes the key events of the protracted intractable conflict:
In 1941, a major conflagration saw Peru emerge victoriously and led to the
signing of an international treaty, the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, intended to define
the norms for a solution, with the United States, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina as
guarantors. Lack of movement toward a resolution and the deep feelings o f rivalry
and hatred over the issue prepared the way for further armed conflict in 1981 and
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1995, with Ecuador prevailing in the latter war, followed by a renewed effort on
the part of the guarantor powers to achieve a settlement.240
Ecuador and Peru continued to reaffirm their claims over the same territory and the
stalemate persisted. After centuries of fighting each other, the Ecuadorian and Peruvian
people experience the same social-psychological factors hindering the peace process
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As one expert explains, ‘disputes over sovereignty are
often so entwined with history and national psychology that those involved perceive them
as different from all others- or at least sufficiently unique to inoculate them against
formulaic solutions imposed from the outside.”241 In addition, the level o f distrust was
high, and there was significant resistance on both sides to engage in negotiations with the
enemy.

Coordinating the official diplomatic efforts o f the multiple countries-

guarantors was also a challenge to the peace-process.243
In 1996 official representatives from Ecuador and Peru were coaxed to meet faceto-face and discuss a settlement to their violent conflict. The track-one diplomatic efforts
were supplemented by “a hybrid intervention o f interactive conflict resolution known as
the Innovative Problem Solving Workshop,” which was developed at the Center for
International Development and Conflict Management at the University o f Maryland.244
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According to Fisher that workshop includes elements o f “conflict resolution training,
conflict analysis and problem solving, and involves influential participants from the two
sides in a variety of activities with the overall goal o f contributing to the peaceful
resolution of the conflict.”"45 During the Ecuador-Peru conflict resolution process, a
series of workshops complemented the official talks and contributed to more effective
negotiations, and to the development of a public opinion in both countries supportive of
4 re-approachment.246 Fisher elaborates:

The workshops began with a trust-building phase, moved to a training phase
providing concepts and skills, engaged the participants in searching for common
ground on the issues, and finished with a reentry phase wherein participants
developed commitments to their jointly-created action plans. The first workshop
was held at the University of Maryland after the official negotiations had started,
and among its many activities developed a shared vision o f Peru-Ecuador
relations and analyzed the positions and arguments o f both countries in the
conflict. The major theme revolved around how civil society could make
contributions to support the peace process; five working groups to foster this were
formed, the last one specifically looking at possible contributions to track-one
diplomatic efforts. The participants formed a joint action group, later named
Grupo Maryland, and paid well-publicized visits to the Peruvian and Ecuadorian
embassies in Washington to present proposals and encourage movement on the
peace process.
The workshops that followed included influential representatives from the border zone
and focused on proposals to address critical problems in that area. The ideas generated
during the discussions were communicated to officials from the two countries.247 In 1998,
several months after the second workshop, a comprehensive settlement was signed by the
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governments o f Peru and Ecuador248, but the Innovative Problem Solving Workshops
continued in order to facilitate the implementation of the peace plan. Official government
representatives were among the participants o f the workshops during that phase, and the
agenda included “developing ideas on implementation o f difficult items” and
“consolidating the peace, largely by bolstering the border region’s economic
development through joint ventures and institutions.”249
The Peru-Ecuador peace process is an excellent illustration o f the negative aspect
of relying solely on track-one diplomacy when trying to resolve a deep-rooted intractable
conflict. For decades, the only contact between the two societies was on the battlefield.
However, the implementation of the interactive conflict resolution model aided the
negotiation process and helped the parties overcome the impasse. According to Fisher,
“numerous ideas and proposals were fed into the track-one process, and many o f these
were incorporated.”“ Most importantly, the transparency and open communications
between the official and unofficial diplomatic circles, as well as the full support o f the
problem solving workshops by both governments led to the successful transformation of
the peace process and the positive changes o f the public opinion in both countries. Fisher
concludes, “Overall, this intervention is a very ambitious effort that attempted to
influence elite, midlevel, and grassroots sectors o f the two societies, so that a
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comprehensive movement could be built in the support o f peace. It appears that this has
been largely successful.”251

251 Ibid., 84.
74

Chapter 5
Conclusion: Paving the Road to Peace through
Interactive Conflict Resolution

Don't ask the mountain
to move, just take a pebble
each time you visit.252
The examination of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the civil war in Tajikistan, the
Moldova-Transdniestria conflict, and the Peru-Ecuador war offers the findings that even
though deep-rooted conflicts are unique, they share similar social-psychological
characteristics and escalating, self-perpetuating dynamics. The dimensions o f the
intractable conflicts cannot be addressed solely via the official negotiation or mediation
processes. They can be attended mainly through unofficial conflict resolution methods.
The coordination between track-one and track-two diplomatic efforts, and full
governmental support of the parallel unofficial peace process, are important factors for
the victory o f the peace process. The successful application o f the interactive conflict
resolution approach in these violent conflicts is indicative o f the model’s potential utility
in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict since they share the same characteristics and
dynamics.

Limitations of Track-one Diplomacy in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Most peace activists and scholars such as Burton, Crocker, Diamond, Fisher,
Kelman, Lederach, Montville, Rouhana, Saunders and others agree that even though
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track-one diplomacy is necessary to resolve intractable conflicts, strictly utilizing a
formal, high-level conflict resolution method such as mediation between the countries’
leaders, is insufficient on its own.253 The high-ranking individuals may have significant
decision-making power, but there is always a lingering question that impedes the peace
process: How will the news of a compromise or a concession towards the opposing side
be received at home? As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the nature o f intractable conflicts is
very dynamic and has layers of multifarious social-psychological characteristics. Thomas
De Waal points out that the Armenian and Azerbaijani “semi-authoritarian leaders are
reluctant to open up the issue of compromise over Karabakh to wider debate inside their
societies.”254 The lack of transparency, the mistrust, and misconceptions contribute to the
cold collective moods in Armenia and Azerbaijan which have been poisoned for years
with hostile acts and inflammatory language against the adversary. In such a dismal
atmosphere, any notion o f a concession or an appeasement towards the other side could
be viewed as a cowardly betrayal of the motherland. The nationalistic rhetoric of
Armenians and Azerbaijanis fuels the antagonism between them. The problem is
exacerbated by the lack of contact between the two nations on a societal level. As a
result, the people of Armenia and Azerbaijan remain trapped by the black and white
perspectives of their current conflict. The young generations are not exposed to examples
of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between Armenians and Azeri which go back
hundreds of years, and the old generations seemed to have forgotten their history. As one
author indicates:
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The current period o f almost complete separation and many years of propaganda
of images of “historical enemies” is an exception rather than the rule throughout
the history of those relations. Currently, the activities o f different mass media,
social research and teaching at schools are not aiming at a discussion o f
inevitability o f peace and neighborly existence. The reverse is true.255

Cornell concurs that “an active process is under way in both republics to
radicalize public opinion and deepen mistrust; a process which includes indoctrination of
school children against the ‘enemy’.”256 The outcomes o f such practices can be horrific.
For example, in February 2004, in Budapest, Hungary, a young Azerbaijani army officer
killed a sleeping Armenian army officer with an ax.257 The Azerbaijani officer “claimed
that he had been driven to his act by the plight o f fellow Azerbaijanis, including close
family relatives, in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.”258 The irony is that the killer and the
victim had been attending an English language course in the Hungarian capital as part of
NATO’s Partnership for Peace program.259 Obviously, the effects o f the relentless
propaganda on both sides carry tragic consequences and are difficult to reverse. However,
these harmful processes could be counterbalanced through interactive conflict resolution,
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which involves constructive informal dialogue between the opposing sides facilitated by
a neutral third-party.260
The mediator’s identity, knowledge and experience are important factors
contributing to a successful peace process.261 Therefore, the absence o f objective and
neutral third-party mediators is another barrier to reaching a peaceful solution. The
doubts and suspicions o f the Armenians and Azerbaijanis run deep not only towards their
foes, but also towards the international mediators who seem to be lacking trust and
legitimacy. The intentions of the leading mediators are often questioned by the parties in
conflict. The official mediation efforts, which lacked coordination at first, are still
perceived as a part of the “Great Game” for political and economic influence in the
region. “ Even though the Cold War ended years ago, the Russian interests are often
contrasted against those of the West, and Armenia and Azerbaijan often play the
mediators against one another.263 As several experts emphasize, “opportunities to
intervene and exercise effective procedural control will be missed if different mediators
are sending mixed signals and there is no clear delegation o f authority.”264
The U.N. could take a more active role in the mediation process and dispatch
peacekeeping forces to the region to prevent additional skirmishes on the line o f contact.
The stalemate of the negotiations could be overcome if there is a little more political will
260

Ronald J. Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution, 145.

261 William I. Zartman, 184.
262

De Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction, 226.

263 Cornell, 123.
264 Crocker, 40.
78

on the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides. Their leaders need to stop the bellicose rhetoric,
withdraw their snipers from the line o f contact, and reach an agreement on the discussed
basic principles. However, these peace-promoting measures would be possible only if
there is a collective change of mood starting from the grassroots level. Instead o f reciting
the typical patriotic statements which boast the might of the national armies and recall
military victories against their enemies, Armenians and Azerbaijanis need to demand a
stop of the cycle of violence and hatred. According to the prominent peace activist and
international mediator, John Paul Lederach:
Transcending violence is forged by the capacity to generate, mobilize, and build
the moral imagination.. .Stated simply, the moral imagination requires the
capacity to imagine ourselves in a web o f relationships that includes our enemies;
the ability to sustain a paradoxical curiosity that embraces complexity without
reliance on dualistic polarity; the fundamental belief in and pursuit o f the creative
act; and the acceptance o f the inherent risk o f stepping into the mystery o f the
unknown that lies beyond the far too familiar landscape o f violence.265
Achieving such transformation would be possible if the international peace-makers begin
to think creatively and move beyond the application o f formal, structured mediation
techniques. The barriers on the road to peace could be overcome through interactive
conflict resolution.

Track-Two Initiatives in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
In the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, third party consultations may be the
catalysts for improved mutual understanding, openness and trust. A constructive face-toface dialogue is a confidence-building activity which would help the parties overcome the
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stalemate and “create conditions conductive to negotiations.”266 Even though there are no
records of interactive conflict resolution workshops being utilized in the ArmeniaAzerbaijan intractable conflict so far, there have been some efforts to reestablish contacts
between the two societies. When Armenians and Azerbaijani gathered to work on joint
projects under the leadership of various nongovernmental organizations, the outcomes
have been encouraging.
For example, breaking the stereotypical notions o f the enemy occurred in 2007,
when a small group of Armenian and Azerbaijani young journalists got together to
collaborate on short documentary films for the first time.267 The visit o f a handful of
Azeri journalists to Yerevan as part o f a program o f the South Caucasus conflict
resolution group called Conciliation Resources was a break-through peace-building
initiative. The journalists did not at all find Armenia to resemble the stereotypes given in
Azerbaijan and reported this; the same happened when Armenian journalists visited
Baku.

The young film-makers admitted that they were apprehensive and reluctant to sit

down with their enemies at first, but as they chatted over some tea and began working on
their film projects, they felt that the barriers between the two groups vanished.269
Furthermore, the entire group realized that they are all sharing the same pain and scarred
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childhood as a result of the intractable conflict.270 The positive results o f this program are
telling; even if they are on a small scale. They demonstrate the need o f more similar
initiatives that will improve communication, and build trust between Azerbaijani and
Armenians. Encouragement of both governments could demonstrate greater will to work
towards peace.
It is not clear if the short films were ever shown in Armenia and Azerbaijan.
However, in 2009 a book called Positive Examples o f Coexistence from the History o f

Peoples and States o f the South Caucasus was published in Yerevan. It contains studies
and articles written by distinguished historians and civic activists from Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia highlighting the numerous “positive historical examples of
coexistence and cooperation between peoples o f the South Caucasus.”271 In addition to
the peace-promoting subject matter evident in the title o f the book, it is even more
encouraging that the participating authors (Armenian, Azeri and Russian scholars)
worked together on the project. According to the editor:
The participants stated, particularly, that direct contacts are important as they let
to understand each other better and to exchange information about global,
regional and local processes... which may contribute towards reconciliation and
establishing an environment o f peace and neighbourly relations in the South
Caucasus. Working meeting participants also expressed their distress concerning
the reality in which the scientific potential o f our countries is being used mainly
for proving ancient roots and superiority o f every people instead o f working on
common scientific and educational projects. Yet, science and education have a
great potential for restoration o f trust between our peoples and may serve as a fíne
instrument for development o f neighbourhood and cooperation in the region.272
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One of the studies analyzed in the book reflects the inquiries o f a team o f
Armenian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, and Russian researchers who visited a small village in
Georgia, where Armenians and Azerbaijanis have been living in harmony side-by-side
for centuries. Even the war over Nagorno-Karabakh and the continuing hostilities have
not ruined the friendship and cooperation between the two groups in the small
community.273 However, the author points out that any topic relating to the conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh is not openly discussed as a way to preserve the communal
harmony.274 Similar were the findings o f the analyst examining the nearby market of
Sadakhlo, a larger Georgian village, populated predominantly with Azeri and located “on
the Georgian-Armenian border - close to the hinge on the map where the three Caucasian
republics meet.”“75 The author describes that “Armenians, Azerbaijanis and Georgians
went there to trade or to engage in different types o f work, whether it be in the form of
paid work for someone else or their own business to survive. “Trade relations” were
conducted mainly between the Georgian Azerbaijanis and Armenians.”276 Even though
politics were not discussed at the marketplace, the willingness o f Armenians and Azeri to
do business with each other is remarkable nevertheless. According to the analyst, “real
living conditions created incentives for people on either side o f the frontline to engage in
273 Ibid., 43.
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trade — often counter to the politics o f the enduring conflict.”277 Since the two groups
co-exist in Georgia, they are somewhat protected from the daily nationalistic propaganda
which impacts the collective moods in Armenia and Azerbaijan. They are also shielded
from the mass media in their respective countries, which contributes in the creation o f the
enemy images that hamper the reconciliation efforts. Nevertheless, the NagornoKarabakh conflict remains a principal factor in all Armenian-Azeri relationships.
Even though limited, the examples o f continuing coexistence and collaboration
between Armenians and Azeri are encouraging. They demonstrate that societal
connections are imperative for building a framework o f mutual respect, trust and support.
Therefore more education and training programs highlighting the benefits of
reconciliation and cooperation are needed. The underlying social-psychological issues of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have left deep scars in the people’s conscience. They can
be better addressed through numerous interactive conflict resolution workshops focusing
on the core problems, and trying to discern a peaceful resolution. Simply avoiding
divisive topics and burying the pain inflicted by the on-going hostilities will not result in
a permanent peaceful solution. Interactive third party consultations conducted by skilled
scholar-practitioners utilizing symbolic gestures, acknowledgements, and other
confidence-building measures can vastly advance the chances o f conflict resolution and
long-lasting peace.

Conclusion
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has all the characteristics and dynamics o f a
complex, multifaceted, intractable struggle, rooted in a desire to satisfy basic human
277 William I. Zartman, 100.
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needs such as sovereignty, security, self-determination, identity, and legitimacy. These
underlying issues shape the national rhetoric and control the collective moods,
perceptions and attitudes of the conflicting parties. Certainly, some deep-rooted conflicts,
including the one between Armenia and Azerbaijan, are exposed to additional factors
which add another layer to their complexity. These factors may include the lack of
political stability and well-established democratic principles, economic concerns and
transnational companies’ interference, the existence o f natural resources and important
strategic location. Fisher’s model does not take these elements in consideration, even
though they may hinder the success o f the peace process as well. As a result, some
experts question the practicality of the interactive conflict resolution. Critics o f Fisher’s
approach often fail to recognize that the main goal o f the unofficial dialogue is not the
development of a peaceful settlement to the conflict. The main purpose o f the model is to
reframe the conflict and improve the relationships between the opposing sides:
Rather than focusing primarily on agenda issues and the need to write an
agreement, participants explore their overall relationship. They examine their own
human needs in relation to the needs o f the other group. While participants in
unofficial dialogue reflect the experience, feelings, and views o f their own
communities, their purpose in dialogue is to absorb the other party’s
perspective— not to force their own. Participants put themselves, to the extent
possible, in the minds of the adversary to understand what he or she needs in
order to change the relationship. Rather than defending their own interests alone,
they may gain respect for the others’ experience, feelings, and needs. They may
experience change in themselves that can seem to bring them closer to the
adversary.278

This is the foundation of Ronald Fisher’s social-psychological theory o f Interactive
Conflict Resolution. In that sense the model appears largely successful. The unofficial
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tract-two diplomacy model complements the formal diplomatic efforts, and may have the
potential to attain conflict de-escalation and reconciliation. Researchers believe that
intractable conflicts are “marked by self-sustaining patterns of hostility”279 which can be
incessant unless a change in the collective mood serves as a catalyst for a new peaceconducive environment. According to Fisher, eventually, the positive changes generated
by the healing process of the dialogues, and the innovative ideas o f the participants would
penetrate the greater society and would allow for the “collective consciousness to include
a shared vision of a peaceful world.”280
Conflict resolution scholars concur that, “subjective forces linked to basic needs
and existential fears contribute heavily to the conflict’s escalation and
perpetuation.”28'Armenia and Azerbaijan have been trapped in a deadlock for decades,
unable to make any progress on a resolution o f their conflict over the enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh. The perpetual conflict has become a representation o f Armenians
and Azerbaijanis, and reversing its spiraling negative consequences has proven a
daunting task.
Solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be achieved through peaceful,
political means, because a breakout o f a new war will be disastrous for the region and the
entire global community. A renewed military offensive will be intense, bloody,
prolonged, and will disrupt major energy routes between Asia and Europe. “Their
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respective combat capabilities, geography and tactical considerations suggest that neither
side could easily or quickly win a war,”282 the analysts proclaim.
The adversaries and the formal international mediators have been unable to make
any progress on the underlying issues o f the conflict, and even though everyone contends
that the status quo is unsustainable, the grim reality in both countries remains unchanged.
During the past several years, the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, namely the United
States, Russia and France, have held frequent high-level mediation sessions and proposed
different peace frameworks to the opposing sides.283 However, the presidents o f Armenia
and Azerbaijan and their high-ranking representatives have been incapable o f reaching an
agreement. The lack of progress suggests that utilizing an official diplomatic method of
conflict resolution, such as international mediation, is not effective on its own. According
the professionals in the field, the negative images o f the “enemy” in a deep-rooted
intractable conflict are highly resistant to change,284 and these views and lack o f trust
interfere with the success of the mediation. The official diplomatic process is too
restricted and insufficient to close the deep divide between the conflicting societies,
because it does not articulate and analyze the root causes o f the conflict.
The history and the geopolitics o f the South Caucasus, examined in detail in the
beginning of this work, provide the context for the social-psychological factors
influencing the current conflict. If certain conditions are met, identifying and reversing
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the underlying issues which control the collective moods, perceptions and attitudes o f the
conflicting parties could be achieved on the micro and macro levels.
For example, the issues o f sovereignty, security, self-determination, identity, and
legitimacy are present in the four intractable conflicts discussed in the foregoing chapter.
The analysis of these diverse case studies, demonstrates that the application o f interactive
conflict resolution could lead to positive outcomes - an encouraging transformation o f the
relationship between the opposing parties which eventually translates into positive results
during the official diplomacy. Fisher explains that “deeper psychological intercourse
which can occur in unofficial meetings, around elements such as historical grievances,
fears and hopes, and the broader base o f support for the peace process that can be
built”285 advocate for the utility of the model.
There is evidence that if certain elements are present, Fisher’s model might have
the potential to ameliorate the inadequacy of the current search for a peaceful resolution
in the Armenia-Azerbaijan protracted conflict. On the operational level, the success o f the
interactive conflict resolution approach depends partially on the design and sequence o f
the workshops, the identity of the third-party moderators, and the identity o f the
participants. In order for the workshops to induce an agreement on substantive issues and
affirmative changes in track-one diplomacy, there must be mass media coverage o f the
positive outcomes, governmental support for the dialogues, and high level of
coordination between the track-one and track-two diplomatic efforts.
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The interactive conflict resolution approach involves a series o f problem-solving
workshops “aimed at cultivating respect and objectivity so that the parties develop a
mutual commitment to cooperative exchanges in their relationship.”286 Obviously, a
single workshop cannot be an effective mechanism bringing such changes. The
relationship’s transformation is likely to occur gradually over a long period o f time.
Therefore, it is best if the participants in the workshops remain the same during the
series. Usually the meetings in the beginning focus on trust-building and joint conflict
analysis and the later workshops begin searching for common ground on the issues.
Herbert Kelman has held multiple problem-solving workshops between Israeli
and Palestinian influential actors for more than twenty-five years. In 1990, however, he
and his colleague Nadim Rouhana organized the first continuing workshop which,
according to him, paved the way to the Oslo accords.287 The same participants met five
times in a period of three years and each session lasted several days. Harold Saunders
organized the Inter-Tajik dialogue, whose participants met more than thirty-five times
over a span o f ten years.“88 There were three unofficial Moldova-Transdniestria problem
solving workshops held between 1993 and 1996 which were followed by a quasi-official
problem-solving conference in 2 0 00.289 The four innovative problem-solving workshops
in the Peru-Ecuador conflict brought together the same participants for a period o f three
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years.290 The venue for these workshops was usually a neutral academic institution
affiliated with the academic scholar-practitioner facilitating the talks.
In addition to being culturally fluent conflict-resolution experts, these independent
moderators must be extremely knowledgeable about the actors and the issues o f the
conflict. The goals of the neutral third-party scholar-practitioners who facilitate the
interactive initiatives are to improve communications and understanding, to decrease
tensions and fears, to affect attitudes and views o f the mid-level influential participants
by addressing root causes, feelings and needs.291 In some workshops the third-party
facilitators are sole scholar-practitioners, and in others there is an entire team o f social
scientists. Regardless of their number, the third-party consultants must have the
confidence and trust of the opposing sides.
The identity of the representatives o f each conflicting side is o f significant
importance to a successful problem-solving workshop. Fisher’s model underscores the
fact that these are influential but unofficial representatives. They could be graduate
students, journalists, academics, community leaders, retired diplomats, political advisers
and so on. However, a closer examination o f the four interactive conflict resolution cases
discussed above, indicates that the greater involvement o f higher level officials in the
workshops, the better outcomes they produce. For example, in the Israeli-Palestinian
intervention, many of the participants later became members o f the official negotiation
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team or obtained high-ranking positions in the government.292 In the MoldovaTransdniestria workshops, some of the participants included “officials in unofficial
capacity.”“93 The Inter-Tajik Dialogue included advisers to the respective leaders, official
negotiators and other high-ranking representatives.294 The participant in the Peru-Ecuador
problem-solving workshop brought together influential people from both countries,
including representatives from the disputed border region, as well as government officials
in unofficial capacity.295 Some members o f Grupo Maryland became members o f their
respective negotiation teams.“96 Naturally, the transfer effects o f the unofficial outcomes
to the official diplomatic efforts are greatly influenced by the identity o f the participants
in the workshops.
Another factor which impacts the level o f transferability is the role o f the mass
media and the sharing o f information regarding formulation o f new ideas with the general
public as well as with the official leaders. Shortage o f publicity regarding any positive
bilateral or multilateral meetings is common in most intractable conflicts. Therefore,
well-publicized campaigns regarding the productive dialogues between the opposing
sides and their collaboration can promote encouraging changes in the collective moods in
the broader society. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the positive results o f the
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workshops were shared with their respective communities through Kelman’s interviews,
speeches and briefings. The Inter-Tajik dialogue produced “a continuing series of
memoranda, based on the participants’ joint analyses and scenarios which have been fed
into the official process.”297 Similar means o f continuous information sharing existed in
the Moldova-Transdniestria conflict resolution workshops. The mass media coverage in
the Peru-Ecuador conflict was a subject discussed at the workshops and became a part of
their peace-building framework. The media covered the workshops activities and
constantly reported on their peace initiatives. In addition official reports and proposals
were presented to government officials on a regular basis.298
Governmental support of interactive conflict resolution workshops is not a
precondition for their success, but it is certainly rather beneficial. A high degree of
coordination between track-one and track-two diplomatic efforts in tandem with explicit
support for the workshops from the official institutions increases the effectiveness o f the
peace process. The coordination efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were limited,
while in the Tajikistan, the Peru-Ecuador and the Moldova-Transdniestria cases “ideas
from the unofficial discussions made their way into the peace agreements.”299
In all of these cases, there was evidence o f positive advances due to development
o f cadres prepared to participate in productive negotiations, the sharing o f information
and the formulation of new ideas that provide important input to the official diplomats,
and the transformation of the societal atmosphere that makes the parties open to a new
297 Ibid., 77.
298 Ibid., 83.
299 Ibid., 86.
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relationship. These positive changes may seem limited at first, but in time they could
induce, along with ongoing track-one efforts, an agreement on substantive issues, and
encourage shifts of political policies and ideologies. According to the conflict resolution
specialists:
These workshops help undermine “we-they” images o f conflict, establish linkages
among influentials, begin a discussion o f framework solutions, identify steps that
will break the impasse, and in general create an understanding o f these steps and
processes that participants can feed back into track-one effort where actual
decisions are made.
Fisher states that the social-psychological approach has the greatest utility in the
pre-negotiation phase of international conflicts,301 because it might have a significant
potential for inducing ripeness and conflict de-escalation.302 Only through interaction
focused on needs and fears may the parties identify actions o f mutual reassurance and
acknowledgement that will lead to their improved relationship and create atmosphere
conductive to effective negotiations. Therefore, the interactive conflict resolution model
might be an essential accompaniment to the official international mediation efforts in the
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. It could lead to an improved
working relationship between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, which in turn might help
them to overcome the current impasse, and enhance the chances o f a peaceful resolution.
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Appendix A:
Map of the Caucasus and Surrounding Countries303
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Appendix B:
Regional Map of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict304
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Appendix C:
Chronology of Key Events of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (1987-1994)305
1987
August
A petition for Nagorno-Karabakh’s unification with Armenia with tens o f thousands o f
signatures is sent from Karabakh and Armenia to Moscow.
November
Demonstrations take place in the Armenian capital Yerevan protesting the treatment o f
Armenians in the area north of Karabakh, and intercommunal violence breaks out in
Kafan, Armenia.

1988
January
The first forced population movements o f the emerging conflict take place as
Azerbaijanis flee the Armenian town of Kafan.
February
Demonstrations begin in Stepanakert, echoed by mass demonstrations in Yerevan and
later Baku. The Regional Soviet in Stepanakert passes a resolution requesting transfer to
Armenia.
Anti-Armenian pogroms take place in Sumgait, Azerbaijan, killing up to 32 people
according to official sources. Almost all o f the town’s Armenian population leaves.
June-July
In June the Armenian Supreme Soviet affirms the transfer o f Nagorno-Karabakh to
Armenia, while the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet affirms its status within Azerbaijan. The
latter position is confirmed in July by the Presidium o f the Supreme Soviet o f the USSR.

305

Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War,
228-295.
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September
Population movements within Nagorno-Karabakh increase as Armenians are driven out
o f the town of Shusha which has an Azeri majority, and Azeri are driven out of
Stepanakert which has Armenian majority. Direct rule from Moscow is introduced to
N agomo-Karabakh.
November
Azerbaijanis are expelled from Armenia in large numbers, leading to mass
demonstrations in Baku.
December
Armenia is struck by an earthquake, killing 25,000 people.
Gorbachev visits the region and the leaders o f the Karabakh Committee, heading the
Armenian opposition movement, are arrested.

1989
September
Azerbaijan’s Supreme Soviet passes a declaration o f sovereignty over NagornoKarabakh, and direct rule nominally returns to Baku.
December
The Karabakh National Council passes a joint resolution with the Supreme Soviet o f
Armenia declaring Nagorno-Karabakh’s unification with the Armenian SSR.

1990
January
Anti-Armenian pogroms take place in Baku, and force virtually all Armenians to flee the
city. State of emergency is imposed in Nagorno-Karabakh and the border regions.
Soviet tanks and troops enter Baku and are met by Azeri nationalist protestors, resulting
in some 150 civilian deaths.
May
The Armenian National Movement party wins parliamentary elections in the Supreme
Soviet of Armenia.
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August
The Karabakh Committee’s leader Levon Ter-Petrosian is elected Speaker o f the
Armenian parliament, and on August 23 a declaration is passed stating Armenia is
heading towards independence.

1991
March
Azerbaijan takes part in the referendum on the preservation o f the Soviet Union. Armenia
does not participate in the vote.
April-July
“Operation Ring” begins. Soviet troops, Azeri police and special forces units initiate
attacks on Armenian villages in the Shaumian region.
August-September
In the aftermath of an attempted coup against Gorbachev in Moscow, Azerbaijan declares
independence on August 30.
Karabakh announces its secession from Azerbaijan on September 2, proclaiming itself
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.
Heidar Aliyev is elected speaker o f the parliament o f the Azerbaijani Autonomous
Republic of Nakhichevan on September 3. Mutalibov is elected president o f Azerbaijan
on September 8.
Armenia declares independence on September 23.
A joint Kazakh-Russian peace plan for Nagorno-Karabakh is signed in Zheleznovodsk,
Russia.
October-November
Ter-Petrosian is elected president of Armenia. The Zheleznovodsk peace plan is
abandoned after an Azerbaijani helicopter carrying high-ranking Azerbaijani, Russian
and Kazakh military personnel crashes over Karabakh. Azerbaijan’s new National
Council votes to revoke Nagorno-Karabakh’s autonomous status and declare it an
ordinary province.
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December
On December 10 Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians vote in favor o f independence in a
referendum boycotted by the Azeri population o f the region. The Soviet Union collapses
on December 31.

1992
January
On January 6 Nagorno-Karabakh declares itself an independent republic, but is not
recognized by any state, including Armenia.
Armenia and Azerbaijan are admitted to the Conference for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE), which assumes responsibility as mediator for the conflict.
February
Hundreds of Azerbaijanis are massacred in the Nagorno-Karabakh village o f Khojaly,
eventually leading to President Mutalibov’s resignation.
March
The CSCE’s Minsk Group is formed with the objective to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict.
April
Dozens of Armenians are killed as Azerbaijanis attack the village o f Maragha.
May
As Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders meet in Tehran to sign a statement on the general
principles of a peace agreement, Armenian forces capture the town o f Shusha. A few
days later, the Armenian forces capture Lachin, creating a land link between NagornoKarabakh and Armenia.
June-July
Abulfaz Elchibey is elected president o f Azerbaijan. Minsk Group negotiations open in
Rome, but they are rapidly overtaken by the recapture o f Shaumian region by an
Azerbaijani offensive, followed by Mardakert in northern Karabakh.
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August
Robert Kocharian forms the State Defense Committee as Nagorno-Karabakh’s new
executive body.
September
Azerbaijan captures the village of Srkhavend and has control o f almost half o f NagornoKarabakh.
October
The United States Congress passes Section 907 o f the Freedom Support Act prohibiting
US government aid to Azerbaijan.

1993
February-April
Armenian forces capture the Kelbajar region, Azerbaijani territory situated between
Karabakh and Armenia. It becomes the subject o f UN Resolution 822 calling for
Armenian withdrawal.
Turkey closes its border with land-locked Armenia.
June-August
In Azerbaijan, there is an uprising against President Elchibey who flees the capital.
Heidar Aliyev becomes speaker o f the Azerbaijani Parliament and is granted
extraordinary presidential powers. This political upheaval in Azerbaijan fuels a number
of catastrophic military defeats resulting in the fall o f several Azerbaijani towns and
provinces- Mardakert in June, Aghdam in July, and Fizuli, Jebrail and Kubatly in August.
September-December
In Moscow Aliyev meets Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian leader Kocharian in secret. On
October 3, Heidar Aliyev is elected president o f Azerbaijan.
Armenian forces capture the town o f Goradiz and the district o f Zengelan. Aliyev
publicly criticizes the Azerbaijani army. The year ends with a renewed Azerbaijani
offensive.
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1994
J anuary-February
Both Azerbaijani and Armenian forces suffer heavy losses in fierce fighting from late
January to mid-February.
April
Armenians begin offensive against the Azerbaijani town o f Terter.
May
In Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, at talks brokered by Russia, the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and
Nagorno-Karabakh’s representatives agree to a cease-fire agreement. It comes into force
on May 12.
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